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Summary
Founded in 1996 by Camila Batmanghelidjh, Keeping Kids Company (commonly 
known as “Kids Company”) was a registered charity which stated that its aim was to 
provide practical, emotional and educational support to vulnerable children and young 
people. It claimed to support “some 36,000 children, young people and vulnerable 
adults”.1 Over the course of its existence, successive Governments have provided Kids 
Company with grants of at least £42m. The charity closed on 5 August 2015, following 
the launch of a police investigation into allegations of sexual abuse at the charity. The 
allegations emerged on the same day that £3 million of taxpayers’ money, released by 
Government ministers and intended to enable an emergency restructure, arrived in 
Kids Company’s bank account. The Government is currently seeking to reclaim these 
funds from the Official Receiver. 
Primary responsibility for Kids Company’s collapse rests with the charity’s Trustees. 
Whether these allegations prove true or malicious, if the Trustees had not allowed the 
charity’s weak financial position to persist for so long, Kids Company would not have 
been so vulnerable to the impact of the allegations. The Board failed to protect the 
interests of the charity and its beneficiaries, despite its statutory responsibility to do so. 
Trustees repeatedly ignored auditors’ clear warnings about Kids Company’s precarious 
finances. This negligent financial management rendered the charity incapable of 
surviving any variance in its funding stream; when allegations of sexual misconduct 
emerged in July 2015 and threatened to impede fundraising, the charity was obliged to 
close immediately. 
The Charity Commission’s guidance requires Trustees to “make decisions solely in the 
charity’s interests, so they shouldn’t allow their judgement to be swayed by personal 
prejudices or dominant personalities”.2 Kids Company’s Board of Trustees lacked the 
experience of youth services or psychotherapy necessary to interrogate the decisions 
of the Founder-Chief Executive. This approach left the Trustees unable to defend the 
reputation of Kids Company and thus to discharge a prime obligation of the good 
governance and leadership of any organisation. It is essential that Trustees of all 
charities ensure that some members of the Board have experience of the area relevant 
to the charity’s activities, in addition to the necessary skills, and that all Trustees have 
the appropriate attitude towards responsible governance. 
While responsibility for governance rests with a charity’s Trustees, the Charity 
Commission’s ability to discharge its statutory duties to prevent, detect and tackle 
abuse and mismanagement in charities is currently undermined by limits in its powers 
and resources. Government must address these shortcomings to ensure that the 
Charity Commission can effectively regulate charities and maintain public confidence 
in the sector. The Charity Commission must work more closely with Government 
departments which are funding charities, improve its ability to identify problems in 
high profile charities, and become more responsive to concerns raised and more able to 
take action. This is particularly important in respect of charities with a responsibility 
for safeguarding vulnerable people and which are facing difficulties. 
1 Annual Report & Accounts, Year Ending December 2013, and Q2, [Camila Batmanghelidjh] oral evidence 
15.10.2015
2 The essential trustee: what you need to know, what you need to do, July 2015 
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Kids Company enjoyed unique, privileged and significant access to senior Ministers 
and Prime Minsters throughout successive administrations. This high-profile support 
provided a context for decision making across Whitehall. Disjointed and limited 
reviews and assessments, often carried out or commissioned by Kids Company itself, 
were read selectively by successive Governments to confirm a pre-existing and positive 
impression of the charity and justify future funding. Despite a lack of sufficient evidence 
about the effectiveness of Kids Company’s interventions, an increasingly controversial 
reputation and clear signs of financial mismanagement, successive Governments failed 
to carry out adequate due diligence and the charity was given over £42m of funding 
from central Government and was released from the competitive processes to which 
other charities are subject. Between 2013 and 2015, the Government released almost 
£17m through direct, non-competitive grants. This approach is condemned by the fact 
of Kids Company’s failure and is therefore unjustifiable in future. 
When deciding whether to hand over taxpayers’ money to charities, Ministers and 
Government departments must carry out due diligence using proven methods of 
assessment before exercising objective judgement. Ministers should not override, or risk 
creating the perception that they are overriding, official advice to hand over funding for 
charities on the basis of personal prejudice or political considerations. Ministers should 
not allow charity representatives to exploit their access to Government in a way that 
may be unethical. 
This unconventional relationship and the lack of a proper funding process have left 
successive Governments vulnerable to misunderstandings - wilful or otherwise - on 
the part of the charity about the level of Government support that Kids Company could 
expect to receive in the future. As demonstrated by the charity’s collapse, the approach 
of successive Governments and Ministers towards Kids Company has proved to be an 
improper way to conduct Government business or handle public money. 
Kids Company did provide valuable support to many vulnerable young people, albeit 
the evidence shows that this was on a considerably smaller scale than it claimed in its 
publications and annual reports. The failures in governance that led to the collapse of 
the charity should not detract from the commitment and hard work of many highly 
dedicated individuals who worked in the organisation. The charity’s consistent message, 
that vulnerable children and young people must be supported with compassion and 
personalised care, must not be lost with the collapse of Kids Company and criticisms 
about the appropriateness and effectiveness of some of its methods. 
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1 Introduction 
1. Founded in 1996 by Camila Batmanghelidjh, Keeping Kids Company (commonly 
known as “Kids Company”) was a registered charity which stated that its aim was to 
provide practical, emotional and educational support to vulnerable children and young 
people.3 It grew very quickly and by 2013 the charity claimed to support “some 36,000 
children, young people and vulnerable adults.” It operated 12 street-level centres and 
worked in partnership with 40 schools across Bristol and London, and at a centre in 
Liverpool.4 
2. As well as receiving support from high profile individuals, retailers and businesses, 
Kids Company was in receipt of some £42 million of public money allocated by central 
Government between 1996 and 2015. Throughout its existence, Kids Company’s fast 
growth and demand-led operating model meant that it was run financially “on a knife 
edge”.5 In June 2015, on the question of whether to make a further £3 million grant of 
rescue funding to the charity, Mr Richard Heaton, the then Permanent Secretary to the 
Cabinet Office, sought a ‘ministerial direction’ on the basis that such a grant would not 
represent value for money. Despite accepting Mr Heaton’s assessment of the charity’s 
precarious financial position and the risks associated with awarding such a grant, Cabinet 
Office Ministers Rt Hon Oliver Letwin, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Rt Hon 
Matthew Hancock, Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General, over-rode 
senior officials’ advice and directed that the grant of £3 million should be paid.6 
3. Kids Company has stated that the grant arrived into the charity’s bank account on 30 
July 2015.7 On 31 July, the press reported that the police had opened an investigation into 
allegations involving sexual abuse at the charity.8 Kids Company closed on 5 August 2015. 
The charity is currently the subject of both the Metropolitan Police investigation and a 
Charity Commission statutory inquiry.9 
4. The Public Accounts Committee has also examined Government processes for 
awarding and monitoring grants to the charity. Its report, The Government’s Funding of 
Kids Company, published on 13 November 2015, concluded that the Government’s historic 
funding of Kids Company was a “failed and expensive experiment”.10 PACAC launched its 
own inquiry at the earliest opportunity on 8 September 2015. Our prime purpose in this 
Report is to identify lessons to be learned from the collapse of Kids Company. 
5. In the course of this inquiry, we have found people whose enthusiasm for Kids 
Company is undimmed, and others who have been highly critical for many years. Equally, 
some witnesses (both staff and clients) have shared accounts of negative experiences of 
Kids Company, and some have done so in an anonymous capacity only, owing to their 
fear of reprisals from supporters of Kids Company. Such fears are indicative of what these 
people felt about the way in which Kids Company operated in its dealings with some staff 
and former clients. On the other hand, PACAC also received accounts from other former 
3 Q2, [Camila Batmanghelidjh] oral evidence 15.10.2015
4 Kids Company Annual Report & Accounts, Year Ending December 2013
5 Q484 [Nick Brooks] oral evidence 17.11.2015
6 Letter of Direction 29.06.2015
7 KCI47 (Camila Batmanghelidjh)
8 BBC “Kids Company charity in police probe,” 31 July 2015
9 Press release, The Charity Commission, New charity investigation: Kids Company, 21 August 2015
10 Public Accounts Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2015–16, The Government’s funding of Kids Company, HC 504
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employees and associates who describe a positive and supportive staff environment in 
which all were treated with respect and consideration.11 We thank all of those who gave 
written and oral evidence to this inquiry, and those investigative journalists whose work 
has helped to shed light on Kids Company. A full list of witnesses is included at the back 
of this Report.
6. Significant media attention has focused upon the personalities and motivations of the 
charity’s leaders, most notably the Chief Executive. It is inevitable that some individuals 
will feel this Report criticises them personally, but its purpose is not to deliver a judgement 
about any individual’s personal conduct or abilities. Instead, PACAC’s priority is to identify 
the lessons to be learned from the collapse of Kids Company by Trustees of all charities, 
by the Charity Commission and by Government. 
7. This Report begins by examining Kids Company, to assess the extent to which 
inherent weaknesses in the charity’s governance and demand-led operating model led 
to its ultimate collapse. In Chapter three, it explores three reviews carried out by three 
professional firms and what assurances these provided to donors and the Government. 
Chapter four examines the interaction between Kids Company and the Charity 
Commission, to understand whether the regulator could have done more to safeguard 
the long-term interests of the charity and its beneficiaries. The final Chapter explores the 
relationship between the Cabinet Office and Kids Company, particularly in the months 
preceding the charity’s closure. At the outset, we recognise the expertise that many 
charities bring when supplementing statutory services for vulnerable young people. Sue 
Berelowitz, former Deputy Children’s Commissioner and former deputy director in local 
government children’s services, stated:
I am not confident that there is any local authority in the land, including 
where I had those responsibilities myself, where we could all say that we were 
discharging all our obligations under section 17 [of the Children Act 1989] 
because the numbers of children in need in this country are quite substantial.12 
8. Kids Company was by no means the only charity serving this client group, and 
many other varied charities are delivering vital support for young people without 
the high profile enjoyed by Kids Company.13 The failure and public criticisms of Kids 
Company must not be allowed to taint the whole charitable sector; we have no reason to 
doubt that the majority of Trustees and charities act responsibly and in accordance with 
their charitable purposes. Equally, discussions about “gaps” in statutory provision and 
Kids Company’s vocal criticism of statutory provision throughout the inquiry must 
not overshadow the exceptional work done by many dedicated individuals working 
within statutory services.14 
11 Amongst the evidence submitted are: KCI21(A10): “We all knew [sic] that our role and responsibility was first to 
support our vulnerable clients and secondly to support each other in an environment conducive to positive and 
adaptive responses”; KCI20, A9: “The level of support I received as a staff member in these roles was fantastic, mostly 
through  weekly therapeutic support in the form of supervision from an independent fully qualified therapist which 
made sure I was supported emotionally and professionally – able to properly process the experiences I had without 
succumbing to stress and exhaustion, and able to treat the young people and fellow workers with the respect and 
consideration they all deserved.”
12 Q525 [Sue Berelowitz, former Deputy Children’s Commissioner], oral evidence 17.11.2015 
13 The work done by small charities, such as Imara in Nottingham, has been brought to our attention.
14 PACAC has also learned of the Innovations Programme, funded by the Department for Education. The ‘Rethinking 
Support for Adolescents’ Programme is running and evaluating a number of projects in local authorities aiming to 
meet the needs of this age group. 
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9. Kids Company did provide valuable support to many vulnerable young people, 
albeit the evidence shows that this was on a considerably smaller scale than it claimed 
in its publications and annual reports. The failures in governance that led to the 
collapse of the charity should not detract from the commitment and hard work of 
many highly dedicated individuals working in the organisation. Submissions from 
former employees document the range of services that was offered by the charity - 
from material assistance, to educational provision and parental support - and we 
have reviewed a large number of evaluations that highlight the charity’s vulnerable 
client base.15 We note that some of those connected with Kids Company are seeking to 
continue three of its programmes through a new charity, 1UP, in the hope of continuing 
some of the projects judged to be amongst Kids Company’s most successful.16 We hope 
that the Trustees of 1UP will build upon the best of Kids Company’s programmes and 
provide effective and sustainable support to those people Kids Company sought to 
serve. 
10.  Kids Company’s most positive legacy is the dialogue to which it contributed about 
the need to improve support for vulnerable children and young people. The message 
the charity consistently promoted - that children and young people must be valued, 
trusted and supported with compassion - must not be lost amid the questions about 
the collapse of the charity and the criticism about the propriety and efficacy of some 
of its methods. 
15 These include: Children and Parents’ Experiences of Food Insecurity in a South London Population (Harvey, 2014), 
Gang Questionnaire Report (Hillman, 2015), Kids Company A Diagnosis of the organisation and its Interventions 
(Jovchelovitch and Concha, 2013), Enough is Enough (Eastman, 2014) Needs Analysis on a sample of high risk clients 
(Hillman and Wainwright, 2012)
16 1-UP will continue the School of Confidence (a mentoring and befriending programme for young people), the 
Treehouse (a centre in Kilburn which aims to provide integrated support for children and families) and SidebeSide (a 
therapy service based in schools).
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2 Governance of Kids Company
The Kids Company operating model
11. Kids Company ran a demand-led operating model, which enabled young people to 
refer themselves to the charity. The charity’s central premise was that no child should 
be turned away.17 In its 2012 Annual Report, Kids Company claimed that self-referrals 
accounted for 97% of its clients.18 Camila Batmanghelidjh, the charity’s founder and Chief 
Executive, has acknowledged the “challenges to both the capacity and the finances of 
the organisation” posed by a self-referral model, as the “structure in this country where 
children and young people, when they self-refer for help, there is no commissioning agent 
paying for that”.19 She claimed that this self-referral model meant that “increasingly local 
authorities and health trusts were unofficially signposting clients to us without paying 
because they were under pressure” and stated that “in 19 years, we did not receive one 
pence of local authority funding or mental health funding for the cases that we had in our 
care”.20 The NAO report indicated that the charity has, in fact, received about £2 million 
local authority funding “to provide specific services”.21 Ms Batmanghelidjh frequently 
claimed that the Government should fund this shortfall because of her belief that Kids 
Company was engaging with a large number of statutory cases.22
12. In oral evidence, Ms Batmanghelidjh stated that “letters between Prime Ministers 
and Kids Company…coloured our decision making” and led the charity to believe that 
the Government would provide statutory funding.23 The charity’s Annual Reports make 
similar assertions that the Government was committed to finding a funding solution.24 We 
have no evidence of such a pledge or intention from Government (see paragraph 127). Mr 
Alan Yentob, Chair of Trustees at the charity, has since acknowledged that the trustees’ 
misplaced confidence in forthcoming Government funding was a mistake.25 
13. Kids Company’s demand-led operating model - based on the doctrine that no 
child should be turned away - carried the constant risk that the charity would not be 
able to ensure that its commitments would be matched by its resources. The charity’s 
Trustees failed to address this risk. Instead, the Chief Executive and Trustees relied 
upon wishful thinking and false optimism and became inured to the precariousness 
of the charity’s financial situation.
17 “Kids Company helps with the whole problem” (Gaskell, 2008). Dr Carolyn Gaskell praised the self-referral model 
because “those asking for help are more likely to be receptive to what is on offer. Importantly such an approach is 
respectful of the sense of agency and responsibility of the individual child or young person.”
18 Kids Company Annual Report & Accounts, year ending December 2012 
19 KCI47 (Camila Batmanghelidjh) and Q189, Oral Evidence 15.10.2015
20 Q189, Oral Evidence 15.10.2015
21 “Investigation: The Government’s funding of Kids Company,” (NAO report)
22 Qq2, 172 and 175, Oral Evidence 15.10.2015. As was also noted in the NAO’s report, Investigation: the Government’s 
funding of Kids Company, Ms Batmanghelidjh’s letters to Ministers often argued that Kids Company was working 
with a large number of statutory cases and should be funded accordingly. 
23 KCI47 (Camila Batmanghelidjh)
24 Kids Company Annual Reports 
25 Q129 [Alan Yentob, Chair of Trustees at Kids Company], oral evidence 15.10.2015
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Level of reserves
14. A key aspect of Kids Company’s demand-led model was that it always operated 
on a very low level of reserves. In her evidence, Ms Batmanghelidjh said that Kids 
Company recognised that it needed to have reserves, but said its “unpredictable income 
and overwhelming demand from vulnerable children and families” left the charity with 
“complex choices.” She stated that for Kids Company to be able to build reserves, it would 
be necessary to “either have proper funding or for the children and families to be taken 
by statutory agencies”.26 Mr Yentob agreed that “the funds were badly needed for the 
increasing demands of the children and young people in our care,” but maintained that 
“the subject of reserves was always a key agenda item at Trustee meetings…and Trustees 
were very conscious of the challenge facing the charity in this regard”.27 The minutes of 
Trustee meetings do not indicate a change in approach arising from discussions about 
a lack of reserves. Both Ms Batmanghelidjh and Mr Yentob stated that Kids Company 
received clear audits throughout its existence as evidence of proper financial management 
at the charity. 28 
15. Mr Nick Brooks, Partner of Kingston Smith, who audited Kids Company from 2011 
until the charity’s closure in August 2015, told us that Trustees should have calculated the 
charity’s necessary level of reserves “on the basis of a number of months.” He suggested 
that six months spending (about £12 million) would have been an appropriate level of 
reserves for Kids Company’s size and demand-led model.29 However, Kids Company 
sustained free reserves at a fraction of this level throughout its existence; they were in 
deficit every year between 2003 and 2006, and again between 2009 and 2011, and peaked 
at £434,282 in 2013 (given that the charity’s expenditure for 2013 was £15.6 million, the 
charity needed £7.8 million in reserves to meet Mr Brooks’ recommendation of 6 months 
free reserves. The £434,282 it held for 2013 constituted only 6% of this recommended 
level).30 The charity’s 2013 accounts are the last that were made publically available. 
16. Although the charity’s auditors always signed off Kids Company’s accounts as a going 
concern, each Annual Report warned that future activity would depend almost entirely 
on the charity’s ability to secure continuing grant income. Management letters also issued 
Trustees with repeated warnings relating to potential insolvency and the sustainability of 
the charity. These warnings did not lead to any perceptible change of policy on the part 
of Trustees. 
17.  The 2013 Annual Report was the last annual report produced by Kids Company before 
it folded. The 2014 year end accounts were never audited or published. In the 2013 report, 
the Trustees acknowledged that the principal risk to the charity was financial, including 
“the need for having sufficient reserves.” The charity made little commitment to building 
these reserves stating only “we aspire to build up our reserves when circumstances allow.” 
Of the charity’s ten priorities for 2014, working “with Government to identify sustainable 
and long term funding for Kids Company” was only ranked at number seven. 31 
26 KCI47 (Camila Batmanghelidjh)
27 KCI49 (Alan Yentob)
28 Q112 [Camila Batmanghelidjh), Q125 (Alan Yentob) oral evidence 15.10.2015
29 Qq479, 480–481, [Nick Brooks, Partner at Kingston Smith] oral evidence 17.11.2015
30 Keeping Kids Company accounts 2003–2015. The accounts for 2010–2013 are available on the Charity Commission’s 
website. 
31 Kids Company Annual Report & Accounts, Year Ending December 2013
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18. Mr Yentob explained that the Trustees had decided that, “because restricted funding 
was so difficult we would try to find assets in other ways”.32 Following a grant from 
Morgan Stanley, Kids Company obtained a building worth £1.7 million as a substitute for 
reserves.33 However, the purchase of this fixed asset did not improve the charity’s liquidity. 
On the contrary, Mr Brooks confirmed that acceptance of this grant may actually have 
increased the charity’s liabilities.34
19. Kids Company was not unique amongst charities in its low level of reserves. William 
Shawcross, Chair of the Charity Commission, stated that a responsible approach to 
reserves “is a problem for all charities.” He explained:
We advise charities that they should spend their money, and at the same time 
they must have adequate reserves, so it is quite a hard act for them to follow.35 
20. Mr Brooks of Kingston Smith agreed that donors may question the need to donate to 
a charity with large reserves.36 However, Ms Michelle Russell, Director of Investigations, 
Monitoring and Enforcement at the Charity Commission, argued that: “if it is a charity 
that is providing services or has employees or it is working with vulnerable beneficiaries, 
the Trustees have a higher duty of care to make sure that their financial planning and 
their business model is much more robust and the safeguards are there”.37
21. Kids Company had 19 years of statutory audits, but the charity was wrong to take 
comfort from this. The charity was signed off as a going concern, but the auditors 
repeated warnings about the precariousness of its finances and the dependency of the 
charity upon future Government grants. In any case, statutory accounts are audited 
and published long after the event and do not show the current state of a charity’s 
finances. 
22. The Charity Commission’s guidance warns that Trustees must avoid exposing 
the charity’s assets, beneficiaries or reputation to undue risk and take care not to 
over-commit the charity. Kids Company relied on a hand-to-mouth existence and by 
refusing to prioritise the building of any significant reserves, the Trustees failed to 
exercise this duty of care towards the charity’s clients, employees and donors. 
Cash flow
23. Kids Company experienced significant cash flow issues and struggled to meet its 
obligations to HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) on several occasions. As early as 2002, 
HMRC wrote off tax debts of £590,000.38 In December 2013, the charity requested early 
payment of a Government grant already allocated.39 As part of this request, Kids Company 
forwarded to Nick Hurd MP, the then Minister for Civil Society, a letter that the charity 
32 Q125, oral evidence 15.10.2015. As outlined by the Charity Commission, restricted funds are funds subject to specific 
trusts, which may be declared by the donor(s) or with their authority (eg in a public appeal) or created through legal 
process, but still within the wider objects of the charity. Unrestricted income funds are income or income funds 
which can be spent at the discretion of the trustees in furtherance of any of the charity’s objects.
33 Q125, oral evidence 15.10.2015
34 Q461, oral evidence 17.11.2015
35 Q466, oral evidence 03.11.2015
36 Q481, oral evidence 17.11.2015 
37 Q466, oral evidence, 03.11.2015
38 Investigation: The Government’s funding of Kids Company (NAO, 2015)
39 Kids Company also requested an early grant payment in December 2014 to help it manage its cash flow (Investigation: 
The Government’s funding of Kids Company, NAO, 2015)
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had received from HMRC. This showed the charity was negotiating a Time-to-Pay (TTP) 
payment plan for £726,721, and referenced “numerous” TTP settlements negotiated over 
previous years.40 HMRC set out in writing that Kids Company’ was “not viable with a 
business model in its present form. Both the level of your income and its profile clearly 
does not match the capacity you are operating on.” It also stated that, while “HMRC have 
provided the Charity with significant support over the last 10 years…it must be stressed 
that this is the final opportunity we will give to allow you some breathing space to get your 
tax payments up to date and finances on an even enough footing to ensure that future tax 
liabilities are paid on time.” 
24. Kids Company often relied upon emergency Government funding to help it manage 
its cash flow. The NAO’s analysis of briefings to Ministers in 2002, 2005, 2007, 2010 and 2015 
revealed that “officials accepted Kids Company’s assertions that it would become insolvent 
without Government grant funding”.41 Government grant payments were released early 
in both December 2013 and December 2014, and Mr Heaton attributed the decision to 
pay the entirety of the £4.265 million grant in April 2015 to the charity’s cash flow issues.42 
Mr Letwin acknowledged that the charity historically relied upon Government for cash 
flow, but pointed out that this didn’t necessarily indicate financial mismanagement on the 
part of Trustees. Instead, he observed that this “may be a sign of quite cunning financial 
management, just a particular kind, which I don’t happen to think is the right way to do 
business”.43
25. Several Ministers authorised unorthodox payments (in the form of early 
Government grants and direct grants) despite knowledge of the charity’s significant 
cash flow difficulties (see Appendix B for full list of payments made to Kids Company 
over successive Governments). In one case, funding was given despite the unequivocal 
assessment by HMRC that the charity’s model was not viable. By continuing to 
fund the charity’s cash flow crises, successive Governments gave tacit approval to 
an unsustainable and inadequate business model and eroded any incentive for Kids 
Company to address its own governance and management failings. This continued 
Government support at moments of crisis nurtured the expectations of Kids Company 
that it could continue to rely on Government to prop up its finances. 
How many clients did Kids Company really help?
26. In its 2011 Annual Report Kids Company claimed that it “supported some 36,000 
clients a year with a range of services,” of which 18,000 were supposedly “receiving 
intensive programmes of wraparound support”.44 However, when the charity closed, only 
1,909 files were handed over to the local authorities (1,699 in London and 210 in Bristol).45 
Ms Batmanghelidjh stated that these referral forms “had on them families. So altogether 
the safeguarding team and the mental health team…handed over between 3,000 [and] 
4,000 clients”.46 A former employee also asserted that “the majority of these referral forms 
40 Time To Pay (TTP) arrangements allow customers who cannot settle their tax payments to HMRC on the due date to 
make payments over a period they can afford. 
41 Investigation: The government’s funding of Kids Company (NAO, 2015)
42 Q87, oral evidence, 02.11.2015 
43 Q688, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
44 Annual Report & Accounts, year ending December 2011
45 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
46 Q60, oral evidence, 15.10.2015 
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related to families rather than to single children”.47 Mr David Quirke-Thornton, Strategic 
Director of Children’s Services in Southwark and leader of local government’s response to 
the charity’s closure, said, however, that he physically received these client files and that 
the 1,699 cases in London were “individual cases not families”.48 
27. Kids Company has offered various reasons for this vast discrepancy: that local 
authorities imposed criteria on the type of cases they would accept (reportedly, only 
“young people who would be left in need or at risk by Kids Company’s closure”); that Kids 
Company did not have access to all of its files when completing the referrals; that this data 
did not include clients the charity worked with through schools, and that its remaining 
files are currently in secure storage and held by the Official Receiver.49
28. Ms Batmanghelidjh claimed that, following the charity’s closure, “the local authorities 
got together and had this discussion about the boundaries around the types of cases that 
they would accept from us and we honoured that boundary”.50 However, Councillor Peter 
John, leader of Southwark Council, has stated publically that the local authority “set no 
thresholds and imposed no criteria.” He explained “we simply wanted the details of all 
their clients so that could assess their needs and offer support as appropriate”.51 Mr Quirke-
Thornton has also commented that “the only details that Kids Company said they had 
withheld were clients who were in the UK illegally” but stated that the local authority also 
requested these details due to concern about “any children, young people or vulnerable 
adults who may be in need of assistance under the Children’s Act and National Assistance 
Act”.52 
29. The Official Receiver is holding 87 filing cabinets of client data, but the status of these 
files (for example, if they represent historic cases, or duplicate other data that has already 
been shared) is unknown.53 Mr John has commented that, “when the Official Receiver 
stepped in following the charity’s closure, they found no other files to pass on” to local 
authorities.54
30. Southwark Council has also reported that Kids Company failed to co-operate during 
contingency planning for the charity’s closure in May 2015. Mr Quirke-Thornton said that 
Kids Company refused three formal requests to share client information to enable planning 
for closure. Kids Company had cited “data protection” concerns, which the Cabinet Office 
subsequently advised Kids Company were not valid.55 On 2 June 2015, Kids Company did 
eventually provide a document, which stated that 15,933 “High Clients” were supported 
in different London boroughs, including clients the charity worked with in schools. No 
further detail or breakdown of these figures was provided to the local authority, nor to 
any other party since, and we have not received explanation of whether the description 
“high” related to high-risk or high-need clients.56 When the charity eventually closed on 
47 KCI08 (A1) 
48 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
49 KCI08 (A1) and KCI06 (Laurence Guinness) 
50 Q74 oral evidence 15.10.2015
51 Q74 oral evidence 15.10.2015
52 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
53 PACAC has seen correspondence between Kids Company and Official Receiver, verifying the existence of 87 boxes in 
storage. 
54 Q75 oral evidence 15.10.2015
55 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
56 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton). Kids Company has also submitted this list to the Committee: KCI06 (Laurence 
Guinness)
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5 August, the premises were locked up and a former employee stated that around 18,000 
files “were no longer accessible to staff. This seriously impacted the referral volunteers’ 
abilities to complete referrals”.57 
31. Kids Company has also stated that the files handed over to the local authorities do 
not reflect the charity’s work in schools, which it claimed served 19,000 children in 48 
schools.58 According to Mr Quirke-Thornton, however, Kids Company was in fact only 
“working in 34 schools in 2014–15 and had already ceased work in 3 schools in the 
2014–15 academic year.” He explained that “in accounting for their work in schools, Kids 
Company referred to the benefit to the whole class of them working with an individual 
child or young person, so they counted the whole class as ‘clients’. I know of no other 
organisation working with children and young people in schools that accounts for their 
‘clients’ in this way due to inferred benefit(s)”.59 Dr Genevieve Maitland Hudson, former 
employee at Kids Company and now Director of consultancy company OSCA, said that 
the “use of aggregate ‘reach’ numbers as proxies of effectiveness is particularly unhelpful. 
It encourages inaccurate reporting and gives very little insight into programme capacity”.60
32. Dr Maitland Hudson also argued that “it was clear even before the handover of client 
files that the charity’s claimed numbers were unlikely to be accurate.” She stated that she 
had analysed the charity’s caseload figures and concluded that “based on a calculation 
using published staff and client numbers (assuming 400 full time key workers and 18,000 
receiving intensive support) Kids Company [staff] had an average caseload of 45. That is 
almost three times the national average in children’s services, which the charity’s leader 
had repeatedly described as overstretched and unable to cope.” She concluded that “these 
kinds of caseloads would not have given the charity the capacity to manage the numbers 
they claimed with the model they described”.61 
33. Ms Batmanghelidjh has argued that the charity’s clinical supervisors, staff, trainers 
and volunteers would have to have “pretended to work with vulnerable young children 
for us to have engineered a deceit.” She called it “unfortunate that the Official Receiver 
has all our records and we are unable to access these in order to evidence our statement” 
and added that Kids Company had invited independent auditors to assess the charity’s 
numbers, but the charity closed before this audit could take place.62 The Trustees have 
also highlighted that Methods Consulting independently verified Kids Company’s data 
and performance figures and “would have raised concerns if they had found evidence 
that Kids Company had misreported its client numbers in relation to its Government 
grant”.63 However, Methods was only required to validate the data reported against the 
Government grant, and did not audit the charity’s publically reported figures (such as the 
figures of 36,000 reached, and 18,000 reportedly offered intensive support).64 
34. A number of visitors to the sites reported seeing very low numbers of children. Sue 
Berelowitz visited four of Kids Company’s sites in her capacity as Deputy Children’s 
Commissioner, and reported feeling “disheartened” and “uncomfortable” on visiting the 
57 KCI06 (Laurence Guinness)
58 Q67, [Alan Yentob], Q2 [Camila Batmanghelidjh] oral evidence 15.10.2015 
59 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
60 KCI31 (Dr Genevieve Maitland Hudson)
61 KCI31 (Dr Genevieve Maitland Hudson)
62 KCI48 (Camila Batmanghelidjh)
63 KCI49 (Alan Yentob)
64 Methods was not required to assess the quality of services provided or conclusions drawn from the data.
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“beautifully equipped environment where you know it should be crammed to the gills 
and there is nobody there”.65 Tim Loughton MP, Under-Secretary of State for Children 
and Families from 2010–2012, said that it was “always disappointing” that he did not see 
many children on either of his two visits (once in opposition in 2008 or 2009, and once in 
his role as Children’s Minister in 2011) and said that this “gave rise to certain queries as to 
why these were not in the front line of people that she wanted us to see and have a proper 
discussion with”.66 Joan Woolard, who volunteered at the charity, also stated that children 
were “conspicuous by their absence”.67 The Rt Hon Oliver Letwin has also commented 
that he “did not believe” the numbers that Kids Company reported in their promotional 
material.68 
35. It has proved impossible to reconcile Kids Company’s claims about its caseload 
with evidence from other sources. The evidence is that the figures were significantly 
over-inflated. This casts doubt on Kids Company’s claims that overwhelming demand, 
rather than financial mismanagement, lay at the root of its financial difficulties. In 
addition, the charity’s practice of calculating ‘reach’, for example in counting a whole 
class of children as clients if they benefited from work with an individual student, was 
misleading to donors. Trustees were either ignorant of this exaggeration or simply 
accepted it, because it helped to promote the charity’s fundraising.
36. If it is correct that Kids Company was unable to refer its vulnerable clients to the 
local authority once the charity closed, given the locking up of all relevant files, this 
may be a serious consequence of Kids Company’s failure to co-operate with Southwark 
Council when planning for a potential closure earlier in the year (see paragraph 155 
for recommendation to the Government). Had the charity co-operated earlier in the 
process, it is likely that full referrals could have been completed and all vulnerable 
people provided with support. Kids Company’s lack of co-operation thwarted 
contingency planning and was highly irresponsible. The list of 15,933 “high clients” 
provided to Southwark Council and the Committee did not assist the local authority, 
or the Committee, in assessing true need or caseload. 
Regulation
37. Kids Company was subject to very few formal inspections or evaluations. Mr Quirke-
Thornton warned that Kids Company had “operated in a regulatory blind spot” and 
described the charity’s activities as “a 19 year journey in isolation from the rest of the 
sector.” He explained:
Kids Company claimed that they were undertaking statutory work but they 
did not cooperate with Local Government, the statutory bodies. They provided 
education in the form of alternative provision but they were not regulated by 
Ofsted. They provided therapy to children and young people but they were not 
regulated by the Care Quality Commission.69 
65 Q545, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
66 Q552, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
67 KCI33 (Joan Woolard)
68 Q634, oral evidence 19.11.2015. We return to the Government’s understanding of Kids Company’s reported figures 
in Chapter 5 of this report. 
69 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
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Ms Berelowitz highlighted a further problem with regard to therapeutic services “insofar 
as anybody can call themselves a therapist and say that they are offering clinical services 
because it is not a protected profession”.70
38. Kids Company has stated that Trustees dictated that “all clinical workers should have 
qualifications appropriate to their roles and responsibilities, as defined by their professional 
bodies, i.e. the UKCP and BACP”.71 Ms Batmanghelidjh held the role of psychotherapist 
and clinical leader at Kids Company but is herself not a member of the UK Council for 
Psychotherapy (UKCP). She claimed to have “been speaking to UCKP’s leadership about 
their facilitating a registration”, however, and holds a “Masters in the Psychology and 
Philosophy of Psychotherapy and Counselling, with a scholarship for excellence” from 
Antioch University at Regents College.72 She also stated that she “had a team who helped 
me with some of the most disturbed children and young people that I was personally 
dealing with.” This team included a clinical key worker, a clinical director and two senior 
social workers.73 Kids Company has also stated that the charity’s Clinical Director held 
two MScs, and is a registered consultant psychotherapist with the Association of Child 
Psychotherapists.74
39.  Other than Kids Company’s early years provision (The Tree House), which was 
judged to be “good” by Ofsted in 2010 and 2013, the charity’s education programmes 
were not subject to statutory inspection.75 Ms Batmanghelidjh stated that the charity was, 
nevertheless, in “continuous dialogue with Ofsted” and claimed that “in Bristol we had 
our provision reviewed by Ofsted before it got registered” as a provider of education.76 
She has since stated that “the inspector was pleased with the teaching provision and 
requested some minor adjustments, which we completed”.77 Ofsted has confirmed that it 
was commissioned by the Department for Education to inspect Kids Company’s Bristol 
provision on two separate occasions. The first inspection (conducted in 17 July 2014) did 
not recommend registration as the facility was considered unlikely to meet the “necessary 
standards”, and the second (conducted on 6 May 2015) “found that the [provision] was 
still unlikely to meet all the necessary standards when open”.78 Ofsted added that it had 
also been alerted to “concerns that an unregistered school was being operated” at Kids 
Company’s Arches II, but Kids Company closed before Ofsted organised an inspection.79 
It has been reported in the media that the Department for Education raised these concerns 
in February 2015, six months before the charity’s closure.80
40.  Ms Batmanghelidjh’s account of Ofsted’s inspection of the Bristol facilities differs 
considerably from the evidence that Ofsted submitted to the inquiry. The Trustees 
should have been aware of Ofsted’s concerns about the Bristol facilities and taken 
action in consequence. Either this information was withheld from the Trustees or they 
simply failed to act on it in the ten months between Ofsted’s two inspections. This 
indicates a serious breakdown of proper governance. 
70 Q536, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
71 KCI47 (Alan Yentob and Camila Batmanghelidjh)
72 KCI48 (Camila Batmanghelidjh)
73 Q111, oral evidence 15.10.2015
74 KCI47 (Camila Batmanghelidjh and Alan Yentob)
75 KCI37 (Ofsted)
76 Q45, oral evidence 15.10.2015
77 KCI47 (Camila Batmanghelidjh and Alan Yentob)
78 KCI37 (Ofsted)
79 KCI37 (Ofsted)
80 ‘Kids Company probe into whether school was unregulated when ministers paid out £3m”(11.08.2015, The Express)
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41. There are a number of safeguarding issues which have come to PACAC’s attention 
during the conduct of this inquiry into Kids Company, most of which neither a select 
committee, nor the Charity Commission, nor a Government department could be 
expected to resolve. There is therefore a strong case for statutory regulation of charities 
who have safeguarding responsibilities for children or vulnerable adults and we 
recommend that the Government considers how such regulators as Ofsted and the 
Care Quality Commission can assume these responsibilities as quickly as possible (see 
paragraph 155).
Quality of services
42. None of the Trustees had a background in youth services.81 Mr Yentob stated that 
Trustees were nevertheless confident in the appropriateness of the services being delivered 
“because there were inspections and evaluations by a large number of organisations and 
institutions...and there have been clinical and financial audits”.82 Mr Yentob referenced 
reviews by the “Tavistock and Portman Trust, the Anna Freud Centre, the Royal Society 
of Medicine, the London School of Economics, University of Cambridge Medical School”.83 
It has been reported in the media that the University of Cambridge, the Anna Freud 
Centre and the Royal Society of Medicine have denied carrying out any evaluations of the 
charity’s work.84
43. The charity has shared a number of reports that point to its strengths. These 
include an evaluation by Alessandra Lemma, who undertook interviews with 8 of Kids 
Company’s clients, and found that they “unanimously, and very movingly, indicated 
that the relationship established with the key worker was felt by them to have been 
transformative”.85 Dr Stephen Briggs undertook a study of 29 young people, and concluded 
that the “multi-layered approach of Kids Company interventions appears well-suited to 
the needs of these young people, sustaining them with practical supports and relationship 
based approaches”.86 An evaluation by Dr Carolyn Gaskell in 2008 concluded that Kids 
Company’s model provided “exceptional results”, stating that 89% of clients with a criminal 
background “reported that Kid Company had effectively supported them to move away 
from crime”, and “of a sample of 240 young people, 81% were successful in their goal 
to engage with education, training or employment”.87 Additionally, an economic impact 
analysis suggested that, over a period of up to 10 years, the “total potential cost savings 
81 We understand from conversations with those connected with the charity that attempts were underway, however, 
to recruit a Trustee with an appropriate clinical background to the Board of Trustees. The Trustee had not been 
recruited, however, by the time of the charity’s closure in August 2015.
82 Q41, oral evidence, 15.10.2015
83 Q12, oral evidence 15.10.2015
84 ‘Kids Company academic research wrongly portrayed’ say scholars (Times Higher Education, 17.12.2015)
85 Alessandra Lemma (2010): The Power of Relationship: A study of key working as an intervention with traumatised 
young people, Journal of Social Work Practice: Psychotherapeutic Approaches in Health, Welfare and the Community, 
24:4, 409–427, p.420. The report also noted : “of course, what people report as helpful is not necessarily what is 
helpful. To establish the respective impact of the various different types of interventions offered to the young 
people within this particular project would require a complex quantitative research paradigm. But, at the very least, 
the voices of the young people …encourage us to take seriously the multiple benefits of the kind of service offered 
by Kids Company, and of the evidently important difference that staff without any formal qualification in mental 
health are able to make to the lives of some of our most troubled young people” (p.425)
86 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF KIDS COMPANY’S ‘LEGIT LIVING’ PROGRAMME (Briggs, 2013). Dr Maitland Hudson 
has warned that “the very small sample size, however, should discourage any further generalisation from this study.” 
(KCI31)
87 “Kids Company helps with the whole problem” (Gaskell, 2008)
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and economic benefits generated from Kids Company were…estimated to range from 
£8.767 million to £9.501 million”.88 
44. Dr Genevieve Maitland Hudson, former Kids Company employee and now Director 
at consultancy company OSCA, has described Kids Company’s approach to research as 
“muddled”, however. She pointed out that “the bulk of Kids Company’s investment in its 
‘scientific partnerships’ was concentrated on academic research in areas of interest to the 
charity but not directly related to delivery.” She added “it had an interest in, and funded, 
research that could have informed its model, but invested much less in assessing whether 
that model was working.” This lack of evidence about the charity’s outcomes has also 
been acknowledged by the Government (see paragraphs 144–146) and by reports from the 
Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office.89 Although Kids Company was 
required to report to the Government on interventions carried out using the Government 
grant, Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary of the Department for Education, told the 
Public Accounts Committee that “most of [the DfE’s] monitoring was about outputs, not 
outcomes”.90 Richard Heaton, Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet Office, judged that 
“Kids Company was not good at measuring its outcomes and the impact it was having in 
society”.91
45. A number of former employees have submitted evidence in support of Kids 
Company’s methods, and have often drawn upon individual case studies to illustrate the 
charity’s positive impact. We received much evidence detailing the positive relationships 
between staff and clients, which enabled staff to take “the help to the children in a way 
that was receptive and had empathy towards the children”.92 Another employee stated that 
relationships “built between staff and clients throughout these years were powerful and 
built on genuine care…[and] that level of care and commitment for the young people…
made Kids Company unique in its work”.93 Another wrote of a community that was 
“unique, it was non-judgemental, it was safe, caring, consistent and more importantly 
provided more than just a tick box scenario”.94 
46. Many former employees believed that offering an “extended family support system 
for the children and their families” enabled staff to address the problems of young people 
in a “genuinely person-focused way…often in much more powerful ways than if staff were 
constrained, through rigid structures, to offering one-size-fits-all-solutions”.95 One former 
employee stated that she had: 
never before been able to in employment focus on a client as a whole person, just 
aspects of their lives...Most organisations only deal with one of these aspects, 
and increasingly have high thresholds for acceptance.  Traumatised young 
88 KIDS COMPANY IMPACT ANALYSIS Economic Impact Analysis for Kids Company’s DfE Grant Response (Buescher, 
Ferdinand, Trachtenberg, Evans-Lacko, Knapp, 2014) 
89 Investigation: The Government’s funding of Kids Company, (NAO, 2015), HC [2015–16] 504 
90 Q28 oral evidence to Public Accounts Committee, 02.11.2015




95 KCI16 (A5) and KCI15 (A4). Similar views amongst staff were also noted in by Lemma, A (2010) in The Power of 
Relationship: A study of key working as an intervention with traumatised young people, Journal of Social Work 
Practice: Psychotherapeutic Approaches in Health, Welfare and the Community, 24:4, 409–427: “All the staff 
conveyed their belief that by ‘being there’ for the young person through the good and the tough times they were 
providing a qualitatively different experience and that this, in itself, helped to challenge implicit assumptions about 
self and others.”(p.418)
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people often live chaotic lifestyles, and for them to see individual organisations 
for all of these things, keep all the appointments and still try and hold down 
employment, it is incredibly difficult.96
47. Kids Company did a lot of valuable work with some very vulnerable clients, and 
had many extremely dedicated and committed staff. We have had many accounts that 
employees were inspired and motivated by the quality of support they could deliver to 
young people, and delivered personalised and effective interventions.97 Given this, it is 
both sad and disappointing that robust evaluation of the outcomes of Kids Company’s 
work is lacking. Without strong evidence of impact and outcomes on a wider scale 
than small samples or individual case studies, it is difficult to see on what basis Kids 
Company’s Trustees satisfied themselves of the appropriateness of support given to 
clients, and the value for money offered by the charity’s high resource model. That 
the charity invested so little in highlighting and evaluating the outcomes of its work, 
despite spending considerable funds on research, gives rise to suspicion in many. This 
approach left the Trustees unable to defend the reputation of Kids Company, which is 
a prime obligation of the good governance and leadership of any organisation. 
Internal controls
48. PKF Littlejohn and Kids Company’s most recent auditors, Kingston Smith, were 
satisfied that the charity’s internal procedures were sufficient to account for the financial 
allowances distributed to clients. A number of employees have stated that they only had 
access to a small amount of cash for clients, and that “the money was not just handed out; 
we would make the purchase and always have receipts”.98 Ms Batmanghelidjh has stated 
that “decisions were not made by me alone behind a desk; it was the entire team”.99
49. However, some former employees have questioned the effectiveness of the charity’s 
internal controls. One claimed that “decisions about the level of funding of many clients 
were made solely by the CEO, with no discussion with relevant professionals,” and another 
warned that “inappropriate and ungoverned spending, could somehow be made opaque 
to outside observers and auditors”.100 It was also claimed that:
large amounts of cash were available weekly, sometimes more often, to…
adults. Some were recorded as being employed at the charity; one such turned 
up weekly, to show his face and collect over £400. Another attended the Urban 
Academy, registered as a student there, but told me that attendance was weekly 
“’just to collect money for taxi travel and other treats”’ (despite receiving a full 
range of state benefits).101 
96 KCI13 (A2)
97 The Committee has received a number of reports which indicate the high level of need of many of Kids Company’s 
clients. These include: ‘Enough is Enough: A report on child protection and mental health services for children and 
young people’ (Eastman, 2014), Children and Parents’ Experiences of Food Insecurity in a South London Population 
(Harvey, 2014); “Need analysis on a sample of high-risk clients” (Hillman and Wainwright, 2012); KIDS COMPANY 
A DIAGNOSIS OF THE ORGANISATION AND ITS INTERVENTIONS (Jovchelovitch and Concha, 2013). Mr Yentob 
submitted a letter from a group of lawyers. This stated that “over many years, Kids Company has brought hundreds 
of extremely vulnerable children to our offices and the courts to fight for their basic rights.”
98 KCI14 (A3)
99 Q37, oral evidence 15.10.2015
100 KCI26 (A12)
101 KCI26 (A12)
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Ms Batmanghelidjh does not recognise this narrative.102
50. A number of former employees have raised concerns that the practice of offering 
financial assistance may have risked making young people dependent on the charity, 
rather than seeking employment or state benefits. One stated that, since the charity closed, 
“clients have been left high and dry, incapable of maintaining their erstwhile lifestyle” and 
argued that “so many young people were kept dependent on large sums of money and never 
guided towards independence and now – overnight – have been thrown back into society 
without a clue as to how to cope”.103 A former employee from Bristol described intervening 
to stop the practice that “anybody who was sanctioned by the statutory benefits services, 
would automatically get a replacement allowance from Kids Company” as this was “not 
helpful to the young person, nor was it sustainable”.104 
51. It has also been claimed that a lack of proper controls enabled young people to spend 
their allowances on drugs or alcohol. Mr Quirke-Thornton stated that the impact of 
closure has “largely been financial as many of the clients were in receipt of cash or goods. 
In some cases I note that this was connected to young people using alcohol or drugs and 
the associated risks of same”.105 Ms Batmanghelidjh conceded that:
There may have been occasions when a young person spent the money 
inappropriately but that could also be the case with respect to local authority 
payments or state benefits or Educational Maintenance Allowances.106
52. During their investigation into a number of allegations raised by former employees, 
PwC highlighted the poor controls around Ms Batmanghelidjh’s weekly cash float. PwC 
noted that the distribution of money was recorded on “miscellaneous pieces of paper with 
the value, date and the beneficiary’s name written on it… [which] does not provide reliable 
evidence that this sum of cash was actually received by the beneficiary.”
53. The Charity Commission expressed concerns “about the prudence of some of 
the spend and the legitimacy of some of the spend” that was uncovered during PwC’s 
investigation of the charity.107 For example, PwC noted that in 2014, one client received 
£13,493 in allowances, £4,704.26 for clothing, in addition to £19,788.33 for housing costs. 
It also uncovered other purchases of high-value items: £305 designer shoes, John Lewis 
“blanket/ throws costing £80 each,” “four items of men’s Outerwear costing £149, £105, 
£85 and £70, one item of Women’s knitwear costing £60”.
54. Former employees made a series of claims in relation to large amounts of money 
which were spent “in the form of goods, hotels, holidays, private medical care, stays in 
various sanctuaries, entertainment, clothes, electrical goods and luxury items” upon a 
favoured group of clients, some of whom were “in their twenties and thirties,” and were 
known “throughout the organisation as “Camila’s specials”.108 Another employee referred 
to this group as “Camila’s kids” and claimed that “inordinate amounts of money and 
resources were lavished on them,” including holidays to Ibiza, a spa, and a first class flight 
102 Q32, oral evidence 15.10.2015
103 KCI19 (A8)
104 KCI45 (Esther Pickup-Keller)
105 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
106 KCI47 (Camila Batmanghelidjh)
107 Q487 [Michelle Russell, Director of Investigations, Monitoring and Enforcement] oral evidence, 03.11.2015
108 KCI26 (A12)
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to New York.109 Ms Batmanghelidjh has confirmed that a small number of clients were 
sent to Champneys for therapeutic reasons, but denied being aware of clients being flown 
being flown first class.110
55. Many of Kids Company’s clients experienced extremely difficult, and in some 
cases traumatic, circumstances, and the unorthodox spending has been put into this 
context. However, the significant costs incurred to provide luxury items to particular 
individuals diverted charitable funds from other projects and programmes that had 
the potential to provide more long-term and effective support to a wider group of 
young people. Such lavish spending was inappropriate, unwise and irresponsible, and 
did not represent a proper use of charitable funds. Given the charity’s known cash flow 
problems, including its difficulties in meeting its payroll and obligations to HMRC, 
the authorisation of such payments was in defiance of the reality of Kids Company’s 
financial position and duties to clients. With a complete lack of experience of youth 
services amongst Trustees, it was impossible for the Board to assess the appropriateness 
of significant expenditure that Ms Batmanghelidjh justified on the basis of clinical 
judgements. It is nevertheless extraordinary that Trustees were content to accept this 
without more rigorous examination. 
Safeguarding
56. Mr Quirke-Thornton said that “operating models in children’s services purposefully 
seek to achieve a safe distance between vulnerable children and young people and adults” 
but warned that “boundaries appeared to have become blurred” at Kids Company, as 
former clients became volunteers or staff at the charity.111 A former employee also 
reported “inappropriate relationships between key workers and clients” due to “untrained 
key workers [having] no idea about boundaries”.112 Kids Company has said that only a 
“relatively small group” of the charity’s keyworkers were hired from the community, all 
of whom were in the process of completing relevant qualifications and had undertaken 
child protection training. The former employee stated, however, that former clients were 
employed in other capacities at the charity.113
57. It has been also been alleged that a blind eye was turned to serious violence, drug 
taking and sexual abuse.114 A former employee referred to two very serious incidents of 
unprofessional clinical and safeguarding practice in the past 3 years. Another alleged 
serious mismanagement of their attempts to raise concerns after witnessing a psychologist 
employed at the charity take and then share Class A drugs with a client. This second 
former employee, who wished to be treated as a whistle-blower, alleged that they were 
initially advised not to share their account with the charity’s management. The employee 
subsequently took the allegation to Ms Batmangehlidjh but Ms Batmanghelidjh allegedly 
instructed the employee to confront the psychologist themselves. An ensuing investigation 
was conducted by someone who had previously undertaken positive evaluations of the 
109 KCI19 (A8)
110 ‘Camila Batmanghelidjh calls for new inquiry into Kids Company’s demise’ (12.11.2015, Buzzfeed)
111 KCI44 (David Quirke-Thornton)
112 KCI19 (A8)
113 “In many instances, clients began “working” for KC – being paid cash to empty bins, move goods in and out of the 
Warehouse, go out in the van collecting donations…They would be paid £50 a day (often whether they attended 
or not) plus cash for a travel card …These young men continued to be employed even when the Warehouse closed 
down (in January 2015).” KCI19 (A8)
114 ‘Kids Company accused of mishandling sexual assault allegations’ (07.08.2015, BBC)
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charity, and who the employee did not consider to be objective. The subsequent report 
allegedly contained information about the employee’s personal circumstances that had not 
been shared by the employee during the interview and were used to judge the employee to 
be an “unreliable informant.” Both employees were suspended during this investigation, 
but were subsequently permitted to return to work. After the employee complained to 
Ms Batmanghelidjh and the Human Resources department that the allegation had not 
been handled in line with whistleblowing procedures, the psychologist in question was 
re-suspended.115 A Health and Care Professional Council (HCPC) panel, to whom the 
allegation was ultimately referred, judged that the psychologist had let vulnerable people 
stay overnight in their flat, tested positive for cocaine whilst at work, taken MDMA (a 
Class A drug which is the active ingredient in ecstasy) in the presence of two clients, and 
offered the drug to the clients. The psychologist has been suspended for 18 months. The 
HCPC will agree the final sanction on 10 February 2015. 
58. The Police and Children’s services are currently undertaking 36 investigations 
relating to Kids Company. Investigations by the appropriate authorities are ongoing and 
no charges have been brought at the time of publication, but a House of Commons select 
committee is not in a position to draw any conclusions from this material while a police 
investigation is in process. 
59. Kids Company’s handling of an allegation about a very serious failure of 
safeguarding was inadequate and irresponsible. It is not appropriate for a known 
supporter of Kids Company to conduct a supposedly independent investigation, and 
that confidential information about an employee’s personal circumstances were used 
to assess their credibility, without transparency about where the information had come 
from, or permission being given for it to be shared. This represents a serious failure on 
the part of Trustees to ensure the existence and observance of appropriate processes 
for handling allegations relating to the safeguarding of vulnerable young people. 
Board of Trustees 
60. Ms Batmanghelidjh founded Kids Company, and led the organisation as its Chief 
Executive for 19 years. She has been described as an “emblematic figure” who possessed 
extraordinary fundraising capabilities.116 Former employees praised Ms Batmanghelidjh 
for being the “heart of our team,” leading the charity “superbly” and working “a 6 day 
week minimum, typically working 10 hours plus each day”.117
61. Kids Company celebrated its “flat management structure”, which it claimed allowed 
employees to raise their opinions and concerns with relevant managers.118 However, a 
number of former employees have reported that Ms Batmanghelidjh directed them 
not to share their concerns about the charity with Trustees or senior members of the 
organisation. One employee stated that, when she raised concerns about the charity’s 
finances, Ms Batmanghelidjh “would brush over them and tell me all was well. She was 
not impressed that I would have discussions with our interim finance director or HR 
director and monitored the interactions I had with them”.119 Ms Berelowitz stated that, 
115 KCI50 (A18)
116 Q114 oral evidence 15.10.2015
117 KCI28 (A14), KCI32 (Johanna Morrell), KCI34 (David van Eegen)
118 Annual Report & Accounts, Year Ending December 2013
119 KCI45 (Esther Pickup-Keller)
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having visited the charity, she came away with the impression that Ms Batmanghelidjh 
was “very much in control of what went on. The ethos, the way in which things were run, 
the general comportment of the organisation”.120
62. It is, however, a charity’s Board of Trustees that bears full legal responsibility for 
maintaining proper standards of governance within the organisation.121 So-called 
“founder syndrome” is, as the charity’s auditors acknowledged, “not unusual in charities” 
but the Charity Commission directs Trustees to “make decisions solely in the charity’s 
interests, so they shouldn’t allow their judgement to be swayed by personal prejudices or 
dominant personalities”.122
63. A number of former directors claim to have alerted Trustees to concerns about 
mismanagement, sustainability and inappropriate spending (which included the decisions 
and conduct of Ms Batmanghelidjh), but Trustees failed to act on this information 
and the directors ultimately resigned.123 Mr Yentob denied that he was presented with 
“allegations” and stated that the “clear whistleblowing process…was not taken” and that 
only one complaint (relating to the appointment of an unsuitable applicant) came directly 
to him.124 This conflicts with accounts from former employees, who documented several 
occasions on which concerns were raised with the Trustees and the Chief Executive but 
no action was taken. 
64. Mr Yentob reported that, in general, the Trustees were content that Ms Batmanghelidjh 
“was continuing to raise the funds and to run the place well”.125 However, he noted that 
over the past two years “the stress and pressure on her was too much,” but it had seemed 
“very difficult at that time to change the structure because there was also a level of trust 
between people”.126 
65. PACAC has had sight of correspondence documenting Ms Batmanghelidjh’s rejection 
of significant financial assistance in November 2014. The minutes of Trustee meetings 
reveal that, at this point, the charity was in £4 million deficit, with £55,000 of self-employed 
invoices outstanding, and was preparing to approach the Government to request a £12 
million grant. The donor offered “unlimited” funding and “a large human resource” 
towards a number of the charity’s projects, and to develop the charity’s infrastructure with a 
view to increasing its revenue streams and disseminating its research. Ms Batmanghelidjh 
instead requested that the philanthropist provide a cash donation of £1 million within a 
week to aid the charity’s immediate funding crisis. The meeting took place on Wednesday, 
and the donor requested “a day or so” to consider the request, due to the deviation from 
the usual process for cash donations and an all-day flight on the Friday. On the Saturday, 
Ms Batmanghelidjh contacted the donor to reject his offer of assistance. She said that 
the potential donor lacked “emotional authenticity”, was not “in a space where [s/he] can 
authentically think about what somebody else needs” and was “not ready to be genuinely 
philanthropic.” She stated that her “intuition” told her not to enter into the partnership, as 
120 Q541, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
121 A list of Kids Company’s trustees at the time of its collapse is included in Annex A of this report. 
122 ‘The essential Trustee: What you need to know, what you need to do’ (Charity Commission Guidance)
123 The resignation of the directors was reported in the media at the time (‘Stars’ children’s charity in crisis after three 
directors quit over the way it is funded’, 09.03.2015 (Daily Mail). PACAC has also verified these accounts. 
124 Q141, oral evidence 15.10.2015
125 Q116, oral evidence 15.10.2015
126 Q114, oral evidence 15.10.2015
23The collapse of Kids Company
it lacked “moral and emotional foundations”, and that “mobilising people’s kindness” was 
more important than “any grand promise of organisational potency.”
66. There is no evidence that Trustees were involved in the decision to turn down the 
philanthropist’s offer of significant financial and human resource. At the time the offer 
was made and rejected, Trustees were attempting to manage a £4 million deficit and 
secure an additional £12 million grant from the Government. Ms Batmanghelidjh’s 
citing of mere intuition about an individual’s supposed lack of emotional authenticity 
as justification for blocking the exploration of a new partnership at a time of extreme 
financial difficulty underlines how unaccountable and dominant Trustees had allowed 
her to become, and how far she was able to insist on maintaining personal control.
67. Mr Yentob was Chair of Trustees for 12 years. His actions in the weeks surrounding 
the charity’s collapse have received significant media attention, with allegations that he 
displayed a conflict of interest in his role at the BBC. Mr Yentob admitted that he stood 
behind the glass with the producer during a BBC interview with Ms Batmanghelidjh 
about the charity’s difficulties, and also made a phone call to another BBC journalist who 
was due to make a broadcast about the charity.127 Mr Yentob said that he was “emotionally 
upset and engaged” by the coverage, and regrets this action “if it was intimidating”.128 
He has since resigned from his position as Creative Director at the BBC. Lord Hall of 
Birkenhead, BBC director general, said that Mr Yentob’s conduct was “improper” but had 
not affected BBC coverage of Kids Company.129
68. A charity of Kids Company’s size and complexity requires a Board of Trustees that 
will demonstrate leadership, judgement and a willingness to challenge assumptions. 
There was a lack of relevant Trustee expertise in the field of youth services or 
psychotherapy, although we understand that attempts, albeit belated, were underway 
to recruit a Trustee with such experience in the run up to the charity’s collapse. The 
admiration that Kids Company’s Trustees had for Ms Batmanghelidjh’s apparent 
vision and fundraising capabilities led to a false confidence about other areas of the 
organisation. The Charity Commission’s guidance to Trustees warns that Trustees 
should not allow their judgement to be swayed by personal prejudices or dominant 
personalities, but this is what occurred in Kids Company. This resulted in Trustees 
suspending their usual critical faculties – particularly over Ms Batmanghelidjh’s 
insistence on the demand-led business model, her exercise of substantial discretionary 
spending powers, the effectiveness of internal controls, and the quality of clinical 
judgements and safeguarding procedures. The length of the Chief Executive and 
Chair’s tenures were not conducive to challenging the Chief Executive herself. There 
was a clear link between the failure to correct serious weaknesses in the organisation, 
and the failure to refresh its leadership. 
69. Mr Yentob denied historic failures in financial management and insisted that 
there were no questions about the financial resilience of Kids Company until 2014. 
Given the charity’s historic hand-to-mouth existence, its continual failure to build up 
reserves, significant periods on the brink of insolvency and its inability to meet its 
obligations to HMRC, this is an inaccurate and alarming interpretation. The evidence 
Mr Yentob gave to the Committee suggests a lack of proper attention to his duties 
127 Qq135, 142, oral evidence, 15.10.2015
128 Qq149, 147, oral evidence 15.10.2015
129 Alan Yentob criticised by BBC director general over behaviour in Kids Company coverage’ (Guardian, 16.12.2015) 
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as Chair of Trustees and a continuing inability to recognise those failures. With his 
fellow Trustees he was unwilling or unable to impose sufficient control. Together, they 
failed to exercise their proper function as Trustees. 
70. Mr Yentob acknowledges his poor judgement in respect of his position at the 
BBC during the summer of 2015. His actions were unwise at best, and deliberately 
intimidating at worst. He has since resigned his main position at the BBC but he still 
retains substantial responsibilities within the organisation and oversees substantial 
budgets. It is not within the remit of this Committee to comment on the governance of 
the BBC, but the proper governance of conflicts of interest and standards of behaviour 
– particularly amongst its senior executives – is a very serious matter for any reputable 
organisation. That a senior figure could act in this way and it could take so long for 
action to be taken reflects poorly on the BBC’s leadership.
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3 Role of professional services
71. Between 2013 and 2015, the Cabinet Office used the work of auditors, accountants and 
consultants to inform its decision making in relation to Kids Company. However, none 
of these reviews delivered a meaningful assessment of the charity’s effectiveness, quality 
of services, outcomes or value for money. They were therefore inadequate in providing a 
useful picture of the charity’s operations or reassurance to potential donors.
Kingston Smith LLP
72. Kingston Smith audited Kids Company 2011–2013, and signed off the charity’s 
accounts as a going concern each year.130 Mr Nick Brooks, the partner responsible for the 
audit, stressed that “responsibility for signing the accounts is firstly with the Trustees” but 
explained that Kingston Smith was content to sign off the accounts on the basis of “a letter 
of representation signed by a Trustee on behalf of the Board”.131 Mr Brooks also clarified 
that Kingston Smith checked the assumptions of this letter, examined the charity’s budgets 
and cash flows and “assessed reliability based on history and previous matching to budgets 
and cash flows,” before confirming that the charity was indeed a going concern.132 
73. However, despite an overall agreement that the charity’s accounts represented a going 
concern, the accounts included identical warnings each year: the charity was continuing 
to grow very fast, had low reserves relative to its size, and activity in the next financial year 
would “depend almost entirely on its ability to secure continuing grant income”.133 
74. The auditors raised these concerns directly with Trustees. Management letters sent 
to Kids Company between 2009 and 2013 consistently repeated two warnings: about the 
charity’s low levels of reserves, and Kids Company’s extensive use of contracted and self-
employed workers.134 Kingston Smith received a response from Kids Company in 2011 but 
the charity failed to respond in both 2012 and 2013. Mr Brooks stated that many charities 
do not “formally respond to auditors”.135
75. There is a striking contrast between the language used by Kingston Smith and that 
used by the previous auditors, MacIntyre Hudson, in management letters to Trustees. 
MacIntyre Hudson called Kids Company’s “history of spending over budget…a very 
risky strategy,” and warned that the “deficit in free reserves currently puts the charity in a 
potentially insolvent position.” When Kingston Smith took over as auditors, the charity’s 
free reserves were still in deficit (-£10,125 in 2011, compared with -£32,464 in 2010) but 
Kingston Smith’s management letters warned instead of “an impact on Kids Company 
sustainability…negative publicity and reputational damage” rather than insolvency. Mr 
Brooks explained that this was simply a case of “different firm, different language,” and 
130 Kingston Smith was only in the very early stages of the 2014 audit when the charity closed.
131 Q492 oral evidence 17.11.2015 and KCI 24 (Kingston Smith) 
132 Q492 oral evidence 17.11.2015
133 Kids Company’s Annual Reports. The Annual Reports for 2010–2013 are available on the Charity Commission’s 
website.
134 Kingston Smith, and the previous auditors MacIntyre Hudson, warned that HMRC may judge these to be full time 
employees and therefore demand PAYE and National Insurance contributions from the charity. 
135 Q500, oral evidence 17.11.2015
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stated that Kingston Smith “probably agreed” with MacIntyre Hudson’s assessment that 
Kids Company’s business model put them at risk of insolvency: “Nothing had changed…
it has always been living on a knife edge, which is in my view portrayed quite clearly 
through the notes to the accounts.”136
76. Section 156 of the Charities Act 2011 places a duty on the auditors of both a non-
company charity and a company charity to report matters of “material significance” 
to the Commission.137 Amongst matters considered to be of “material significance” are 
“failure(s) of internal controls, including failure(s) in charity governance, that resulted 
in a significant loss or misappropriation of charitable funds, or which leads to significant 
charitable funds being put at major risk”.138 However, Kingston Smith did not notify the 
Charity Commission about the charity’s failure to address its precarious funding situation 
- which ultimately led to the charity’s folding, the loss of significant charitable funds and 
the collapse in the support framework of a large number of vulnerable people. Mr Brooks 
acknowledged that he “had not considered whether that would be an area [of interest to 
the Charity Commission] and going forward I would think about that”.139 We respect Mr 
Brooks’s honesty in this matter. 
77. Kingston Smith has offered no credible explanation for changing the warnings 
of insolvency from those issued by the preceding auditors. Mr Brooks stated that 
Kingston Smith’s softer language still indicated that Kids Company was “living on a 
knife-edge.” It is surprising that Kingston Smith did not consider its duty to alert the 
Charity Commission to the extremely high risk of failure in this charity, in accordance 
with its duty as charity auditors under Section 156 of the Charities Act 2011. We note 
that this is a lesson that Mr Brooks appeared to accept under our examination, but this 
lesson should be learned by the audit profession as a whole.
Assessment of internal controls
78. The International Standard on Auditing (UK and Ireland) 530 dictates that “the 
higher the auditor’s assessment of the risk of material misstatement, the larger the sample 
size needs to be,” and that auditors should assess the risk of material misstatement by 
considering the “inherent risk and control risk”.140 Mr Brooks confirmed that Kingston 
Smith’s judgements about the charity were based on samples selected by a computer 
as “there were thousands of documents and we can only test a sample,” but stated that 
Kingston Smith felt that the charity’s internal financial controls “as we checked them were 
more than adequate for an organisation of that size”.141 This assessment of the charity’s 
internal controls would have influenced Kingston Smith’s decisions about what constituted 
an appropriate sample size. 
79. Mr Brooks stated that PwC and PKF Littlejohn’s reviews had “much more of an 
internal audit nature, where you look in much more detail at a lot more invoices”.142 When 
asked about the “miscellaneous pieces of paper” that PwC stated Ms Batmanghelidjh used 
to document distribution of her float, Mr Brooks stated that he was “unaware” of this 
136 Qq485, 492 oral evidence 17.11.2015
137 Charities Act 2011
138 Charity Commission Guidance for Auditors and Independent Examiners
139 Q503, oral evidence 17.11.2015 
140 The International Standard on Auditing (UK and Ireland) 530 
141 Qq430, 465, oral evidence 17.11.2015
142 Q430, oral evidence 17.11.2015
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practice and that Kingston Smith “might or might not have chosen one of her expenses 
from the sample that we undertook”.143 He also said that Kingston Smith’s samples did 
not uncover the examples of excessive spending highlighted by a number of witnesses 
throughout the inquiry. 
80. Mr Brooks clarified that, as the charity’s auditor, Kingston Smith was concerned with 
checking payments were “properly authorised and correctly treated through the system” 
and did not assess whether the charity’s spending was in line with charitable objectives, or 
whether clinical assessments justified the expenditure.144 Mr Brooks stated that: 
if a therapist or one of the case workers felt that money should be spent on 
that individual, it is very difficult for us as auditors to say, “We don’t believe 
that is right’… I think that comes down to the overall management of the 
organisation, the governance and how it is run.145 
81. Mr Brooks also stated that he would not “be in a position to make [an] assessment” 
about whether therapists employed by the charity were appropriately qualified.146
82. It is regrettable that, in over three years of auditing the charity, Kingston Smith’s 
sampling method failed to uncover any of the issues that have since emerged regarding 
the charity’s expenditure and internal controls. Kingston Smith appeared to be 
over-confident in the charity’s internal controls. This in turn may have influenced 
the sampling process and the level of scrutiny to which the charity was subject. For 
a charity that the auditors acknowledged was “unorthodox”, particular vigilance in 
identifying the audit risks and sampling size should have been especially important.147 
In addition, the failure of Kids Company’s Trustees to respond to recommendations 
repeatedly laid out in management letters suggest that Kingston Smith’s confidence in 
the charity’s management was misplaced. 
83. Kingston Smith did not consider it part of its remit to assure the public of whether 
Kids Company spent money in line with its charitable objectives. Ultimately, discretion 
over appropriate spending rests with the charity’s Trustees, not the auditors or the 
Charity Commission. This inquiry provides a reminder to all who use charity accounts 
that a set of audited accounts do not provide assurance that charitable funds are being 
used wisely or that a charity is well run.
84. Ms Batmanghelidjh’s use of the fact that the charity had 19 years of clear audits, 
while true, is also disingenuous. Each time the charity’s accounts were signed off 
as a going concern, the auditors issued significant warnings to the charity about 
the precariousness of its demand-led operating model and the dependency of the 
charity upon future grants and emergency funding. However opaque the language, 
the meaning should have been clear enough to the Trustees and CEO. Such repeated 
warnings should have led to a change to the reserves policy, contingency planning for 
insolvency and substantial downsizing many years before the final crisis. 
143 Q448, oral evidence 17.11.2015
144 Q415, oral evidence 17.11.2015
145 Q416, oral evidence 17.11.2015
146 Q437 oral evidence 17.11.2015
147 Q411, oral evidence 17.11.2015
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PKF Littlejohn
85. In December 2013, PKF Littlejohn LLP was engaged by the Cabinet Office to review 
the financial and governance controls of Kids Company because it was “nervous about 
the charity’s financial controls and governance” and wished to “work out whether the 
charity was being badly run”.148 Correspondence between Nick Hurd, the then Minister 
for Civil Society in the Cabinet Office, and Kids Company shows that the Cabinet Office 
held £500,000 of an early £1 million grant payment contingent on the outcome of PKF 
Littlejohn’s review.149 
86. Overall, the report concluded that the charity’s governance system “appears to be 
appropriate for its size and complexity. Board and Committee responsibilities are well 
documented and, more importantly, understood. We have no recommendations to make 
in terms of improvements to the governance systems and risk assessment processes”.150 
The Cabinet Office subsequently released the remaining £500,000 as agreed.151 
87. In the tender documents for the contract to complete the review, the ‘Scope of 
Requirement’ required the successful bidder to use “appropriate methods…to assess the 
effectiveness of the charity’s governance and controls”.152 However, in written evidence, 
PKF Littlejohn stated that “an assessment of the effectiveness of these policies and 
procedures was outside the scope of our review”.153 Instead, it claimed that the review was 
limited to “establishing the policies and procedures in place and assessing whether these 
policies and procedures were appropriate for a charity of similar size and complexity to 
Kids Company”.154 
88. As Alastair Duke, Partner at PKF Littlejohn who oversaw the review of Kids 
Company, acknowledged: “what must be made clear is that good financial controls and 
good governance controls will not necessarily result in the correct decisions being made”.155 
When asked to explain why the final report did not deliver the requirements outlined 
in the tender document, Mr Duke stated that PKF Littlejohn “worked throughout the 
planning stage with the Cabinet Office explaining the work that we were going to do and 
agreed the work programme”.156 Evidence from Mr Letwin, however, has indicated that 
Cabinet Office did in fact treat the report as if it offered the assurances of the original 
scope (see paragraph 159). Mr Duke stated that “how the report was used subsequently by 
the Cabinet Office is not something I can answer”.157
148 Qq30, 100 , [Richard Heaton] oral evidence to Public Accounts Committee 02.11.2015 
149 The review was carried out at Kids Company’s offices 15–24 January 2014, and the report was issued on 3 March 
2014.
150 Kids Company Review of Financial and Governance Controls, PKF Littlejohn report (March 2014)
151 Ms Batmanghelidjh claimed that Cabinet Office attempted to “tamper with the independent audit carried out by 
PKF Littlejohn in order to make it more negative (KCI58).” Mr Duke explained that there were “minor amendments,” 
following input from both Kids Company and the Cabinet Office, but that “nothing of substance changed from the 
draft one to the final draft that I signed.” He stated that Cabinet Office asked PKF Littlejohn to move the warning 
about the charity’s cash flow to the beginning of the report, and confirmed that he “thought it was a good idea, to 
bring that upfront to the very first page,” because the charity’s cash flow and low reserves represented the biggest 
risk to the charity. 
152 KCI23 (PKF Littlejohn)
153 KCI23 (PKF Littlejohn)
154 KCI23 (PKF Littlejohn)
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89. The Cabinet Office’s tender for the contract to review Kids Company required the 
successful bidder to provide the Government with assurances about the effectiveness 
of Kids Company’s governance. PKF Littlejohn now says that the original scope was 
narrowed, in agreement with Cabinet Office, to establishing whether the policies 
and procedures in place were appropriate. PKF Littlejohn asserts that Ministers took 
assurances from the report that were outside the scope of the review. The Cabinet Office 
should have identified that the PKF Littlejohn remit had altered and communicated 
this message clearly to future users of the report. This would have minimised the 
weight Ministers placed upon the very limited assurances the report offered. 
90. However, it is not acceptable that a report commissioned to provide a professional 
assessment of a charity’s governance and controls looked only at systems and processes; 
as Mr Duke acknowledged, good controls can be overridden. PKF Littlejohn’s review 
did not assess the organisation’s sustainability in financial and reputational terms 
and proved to be of little value in assessing the effectiveness of the organisation’s 
governance. Without reviewing, for example, decision-making, attitudes and habits of 
behaviour, risk-management and strategic objectives in the organisation, a contractor 
could not assess the effectiveness of the charity’s governance and controls and deliver 
upon the tender’s requirements. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
91. On 16 July 2015, the Charity Commission met former employees of Kids Company, 
who made a number of allegations about financial practices at the charity. These included 
allegations of possible unlawful trading, non-charitable expenditure and employment 
irregularities. At the direction of the Charity Commission, Kids Company commissioned 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to investigate the allegations. 
92. PwC’s investigation began on 23 July, with the agreement that “initial findings” 
would be shared with Kids Company and the Charity Commission three days later. 
The preliminary investigation cost Kids Company £26,300 in time costs, and £1,000 for 
expenses.158 PwC reported spending 100 hours conducting this stage of the investigation.159 
93. Mr Will Richardson, Partner at PwC who oversaw the investigation, stated that, 
initially (on 21 July), the charity requested “an answer to the allegations by that Thursday 
(23 July) evening” but “pragmatically that was not possible”.160 Instead, PwC worked 
with Kids Company to decide which allegations to investigate in the short period of time 
available. Of the eight allegations reported to the Charity Commission, five were selected 
for preliminary investigation on the basis that progress could be made in the few days 
available.161 Mr Richardson noted that PwC covered as much ground as possible in the 
time available, but stressed that the investigation had only been under way for three days 
and that the work was not complete. The preliminary report emphasises “the very limited 
nature of the work” undertaken by PWC and makes clear that “we have not carried out 
anything in the nature of an audit.”
158 Q274, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
159 Q250, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
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94. The Cabinet Office delayed payment of the £3 million grant until the competition of 
PwC’s preliminary investigation, but Mr Richardson said that he was unaware “that the 
Cabinet Office was waiting to see our report before any decision was taken” about whether 
to release funds. 162 He was, however, “aware that the charity was in financial difficulty” 
and that it “wanted an answer” to serious allegations. He was unsure “how those factors 
interplayed to create a very short timescale”.163 
95. When asked what assurance a reader should take from PwC’s preliminary report, Mr 
Richardson said that he “would not use the term assurance”.164 He said that he was aware 
that the Charity Commission wanted to know “whether there was any substance to the 
allegations,” and stated that the preliminary report had “determined that there was no 
basis for one of the allegations and started to give a sense of direction of travel in relation 
to the other four.” He added, however, that the fact that “there was no direct evidence at 
that point in time, with the very specific work that we had undertaken in relation to those 
specific allegations” came with the “big caveat” that the investigation was not complete.165 
96. Phase Two of the investigation, which never took place, would have required PwC to 
examine “the documentation trail, to see that those beneficiaries had gone through the 
normal clinical acceptance procedures” as well as to cross-reference the clinically assessed 
needs of relevant individuals with the payments made in relation to those needs and to 
corroborate some of the explanations given for the expenditure. Explanations requiring 
corroboration included those offered by Ms Batmanghelidjh, whose responses to each 
allegation were published in the report. Mr Richardson explained that PwC “had not 
had time to corroborate Ms Batmanghelidjh’s answers” but nevertheless felt that it was 
“important to put the fact that we received those explanations into the report”.166
97. PwC’s preliminary report was of little value to Kids Company, the Charity 
Commission or the Cabinet Office. Although investigation into one allegation had been 
completed, the remaining reports were subject to such heavy caveats in consequence 
of the very short timeframe that no conclusions could be drawn. Nevertheless, the 
report was cited by supporters of Kids Company as proof there was no substance to 
the allegations. Kids Company’s rush to complete the investigation resulted in a report 
that offered no real assurances for the considerable costs incurred.
98. All three professional firms identified matters of concern relating to Kids 
Company, yet not one of them reported the scale of risk carried by the charity to the 
Trustees, the Cabinet Office or Charity Commission. This is a salutary warning about 
the use of professional advisers. They are no substitute for the exercise of judgement. 
They tend to limit the scope of the terms of their investigation in order to limit their 
162 Q254, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
163 Q253, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
164 Q261, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
165 Q305 oral evidence, 17.11.2015
166 Q285, oral evidence 17.11.2015 Investigation would also begin into the three allegations that had not been covered 
in Phase One: allegations of trading while insolvent; making payments outside of its objects and; whether there 
were any implications in relation to a beneficiary on state benefits also receiving benefit payments. Although PwC’s 
letter of engagement was sent to the charity on 4 August, the charity closed down the following day and Phase 2 
did not begin. The preliminary report noted a number of expenses incurred buying individual items purchased for 
beneficiaries. These included £80 blankets from John Lewis; men’s outerwear costing £149; designer shoes for £305; 
and over £4,700 spent on clothing for one client in one year. Mr Richardson confirmed that these payments were 
“irregular” within a charity but stated that PwC was unable to pass a judgement on whether this was appropriate 
without “connecting clinical assessed needs and payments made in relation to those needs,” which would have 
formed Phase 2 of the investigation.
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own exposure to risk. In this case, they were able to avoid making any examination of 
the wider issues that threatened the charity’s existence. In the partial assurances they 
offered, the resulting reports may actually have obscured more than they revealed to 
those who read them. 
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4 Charity Commission
Monitoring of Kids Company’s finances
99. Although Kids Company’s finances were precarious for most of its existence and 
generated controversy and concern, the Charity Commission did not intervene because 
“the issue of insolvency in itself is not necessarily a regulatory issue”.167 Ms Michelle Russell, 
Director of Investigations, Monitoring and Enforcement at the Charity Commission, 
pointed out that the charity had an “unqualified audit report, so it was signed off as a 
going concern each year, albeit there were comments made about or known about its cash-
flow areas”.168 
100. The Charity Commission only has the power to intervene in the governance of an 
individual charity if there are specific concerns relating to mismanagement or misconduct.169 
The Charity Commission stated that it had had no reason to investigate Kids Company 
before 2014, and received “remarkably few complaints about Kids Company before this 
summer”.170 It has been reported in the media that the Pilgrim Trust reported concerns 
about Kids Company to the Charity Commission as early as 2002, but the Charity 
Commission no longer holds records of its response and has been unable to clarify what 
action it took.171 William Shawcross, Chair of the Charity Commission, told us that he 
“wish[ed] we had had a regulatory cause to investigate the charity much earlier”.172 
101. The Charity Commission did discuss Kids Company’s finances with the charity 
at several points in the year leading up to its collapse, in response to contact from the 
charity’s management and negative press coverage. The first meeting took place in March 
2015. During this meeting, the Charity Commission “did have the conversation…about 
the reserves and the financial stability of the organisation” but noted that Kids Company 
“had a plan in place” to address the funding situation.173 The Charity Commission had 
no regulatory role in overseeing the execution of this plan, as “restructuring and getting 
a charity back on a footing that is financially stable is not necessarily a regulatory issue”.174 
However, it left an “open door” for the Charity Commission, who asked to be kept 
informed about what was going on, “particularly in relation to the financial stability of 
the organisation”.175 
102.  Over the next two months, the Charity Commission received several updates from 
Ms Batmanghelidjh, but the Trustees also warned the Commission that funding difficulties 
continued and a restructure or potential closure might occur. Throughout July, the Charity 
Commission kept in close contact with the Cabinet Office and Kids Company in relation 
to the allegations under investigation by PwC and the funding situation. On 4 August, 
167 Q455, [Michelle Russell], oral evidence, 03.11.2015
168 Q455, [Michelle Russell], oral evidence, 03.11.2015
169 Tackling abuse and mismanagement. Annex 1: the Charity Commission’s approach to tackling abuse and 
mismanagement
170 Q434, [William Shawcross] oral evidence, 03.11.2015
171 Kids Company concerns raised as early as 2002’ (14.10.2015, BBC). The same article also noted that New Philanthropy 
Capital raised concerns about Kids Company’s governance, a lack of outcome data, and inappropriate use of funding 
to Trustees in 2006, but did not take these concerns to the Charity Commission. 
172 Q459, oral evidence, 03.11.2015
173 Qq469, 455, [Michelle Russell] oral evidence, 03.11.2015
174 Q455, [Michelle Russell] oral evidence, 03.11.2015
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Kids Company informed the Charity Commission that it would be closing the following 
day. On 21 August, the Charity Commission announced a statutory inquiry into Kids 
Company’s governance and financial management “in light of the intense public scrutiny 
and speculation over the charity’s activities, and the increasing number of allegations in 
the public domain about its governance and financial management”.176 
103. The Charity Commission’s investigation is ongoing, and we await its conclusions. 
However, Ms Russell acknowledged that there were already several learning points for 
the Charity Commission from the collapse of Kids Company. First, she noted that even 
if a charity has an unqualified set of accounts, “there still may be issues about financial 
stability, and that is a lesson not just for us, but for the sector and the public themselves”.177 
Ms Russell indicated that the Charity Commission has limited IT capability to interrogate 
the 60,000 sets of annual accounts it receives each year but has a “plan in place” to address 
that capacity issue.178
104. A second area of learning is in relation to reserves. Ms Russell and Mr Shawcross 
stated that the Charity Commission must “tread the line carefully about not fettering or 
interfering with Trustees’ discretion” but said the Commission would “clarify and sharpen 
up our guidance in light of what has happened over the summer”.179
105. It is remarkable that so few people thought it appropriate to complain to the 
Charity Commission about Kids Company, despite donors and others expressing 
concerns as far back as 2002, and open adverse comment about Kids Company in 
the media. This reflects the Charity Commission’s failure to make people aware of 
this possibility. Complaints would have prompted investigation and could have led to 
improvements in the charity’s governance and operations. 
106. In the months leading up to Kids Company’s collapse, the Charity Commission 
worked closely with the charity after receiving complaints from a donor and former 
employees, but substantive discussions about its precarious financial situation only 
occurred after the charity’s finances reached crisis point. Earlier intervention from 
the Charity Commission to advise changes to the operating model might have helped 
to safeguard the charity, although this has not historically been the role of the Charity 
Commission. The Charity Commission must make its own judgement about a charity, 
rather than simply relying on government engagement with an organisation as 
evidence of a charity’s good governance or effectiveness. 
107. We welcome the provisions in the Charities (Protection and Social 
Investment) Bill to give the Charity Commission new powers to disqualify a 
person from being a charity Trustee if: at least one of six conditions applies 
to the individual; if an individual is unfit to be a Trustee; and if making the 
order is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and 
confidence in charities (either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of 
charity specified or described in the order). Amongst the six conditions that may, in 
conjunction with the tests mentioned above, disqualify a person from being a Trustee 
is if a the person was a Trustee, charity Trustee, officer, agent or employee of a charity 
at a time when there was misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of 
176 Press release, The Charity Commission, New charity investigation: Kids Company, 21 August 2015 
177 Q510, oral evidence, 03.11.2015
178 Q469, oral evidence, 03.11.2015
179 Q467, oral evidence, 03.11.2015
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the charity, and was: responsible for the misconduct or mismanagement; knew of the 
misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take any reasonable step to oppose it; or 
the person’s conduct contributed to or facilitated the misconduct or mismanagement. 
The Charity Commission’s new powers may be applicable to the case of Kids Company. 
108.  There are both legal parameters and resourcing issues that currently limit what 
the Charity Commission can do to improve the effectiveness of a charity’s governance. 
It is the role of Trustees, not the regulator, to ensure that a charity is well run. However, 
if the Charity Commission is to maintain public faith in charities and deliver on its 
statutory duty to prevent, detect and tackle mismanagement in charities, it must have 
the resources and powers to advise and investigate charities at an earlier stage and to 
support charities through restructures and downsizing. 
109. While it is not possible for the Charity Commission to interrogate deeply the 
60,000 accounts it reportedly receives each year, high risk charities – for example 
those with a large number of employees or a vulnerable client base – must be under 
the greatest scrutiny. We await with interest the outcome of the Charity Commission’s 
technology transformation plan, which should enable the Commission to identify and 
scrutinise high-risk charities.180
110. Trustees must have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that a charity has a 
responsible approach to reserves but the Charity Commission must do more to help 
to make Trustees aware of their responsibilities in this area. We look forward to the 
Charity Commission’s reviewed guidance on charity reserves, and expect it will impress 
upon Trustees of large or complex charities their increased responsibilities in this area. 
111. The Charity Commission should revise its guidance to auditors, to ensure that 
expectations about auditors’ reporting duties under Section 156 of the Charities Act 
2011 are appropriately conveyed. Such guidance must be clearer on the circumstances 
in which auditors should pass on concerns about an unsustainable operating model, 
including an inappropriate reserves policy. 
112. The Charity Commission should consider how it can better impress upon Trustees 
the need to ensure that the Board includes those with appropriate experience of the areas 
relevant to the charity’s activities. Some Trustees must have this relevant experience, 
so that they can evaluate the quality of the charity’s activities, and a range of skills 
must be reflected on the Board. All Trustees must have a responsible attitude towards 
governance. 
Donor complaint
113. Prior to July 2015, the Charity Commission stated that it had received only one donor 
complaint about Kids Company – from an individual who had sold her house to donate to 
Kids Company, and was unhappy with how the charity had handled her donation.181 She 
requested that her donation be returned, and complained to the Charity Commission in 
180 Ms Russell explained that the Charity Commission is seeking to use its £8 million Invest to Save grant to “make 
improvements and developments…in our risk assessment of the different types of risks for different types of 
charities…we will look at different formulas for different types of charity, for different types of risk.” Q470 oral 
evidence, 03.11.2015
181 Q435, [Michelle Russell] oral evidence 03.11.2015
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October 2014.182 Ms Batmanghelidjh told PACAC that “the Charity Commission advised 
us not to return her money”.183 The Charity Commission stated, however, “that there is 
nothing on record showing or suggesting that our advice was sought or given on repaying 
the donation”.184 Mr Shawcross also commented that, as the donor “had not placed any 
limitations on the way in which the money was spent”, it was “rather difficult to insist that 
the money be repaid,” as Kids Company had not acted illegally.185 
114. In light of the Charity Commission’s evidence, Kids Company subsequently 
explained that “there is a difference of recollection as to whether advice was given or 
not.” Mr Richard Handover, Deputy Chair of the Trustees, recalled “a long discussion 
[with the Charity Commission] about [a donor complaint] where it was acknowledged we 
had provided full documentary evidence that the money had been spent in line with the 
donor’s request. After a full discussion there was never any suggestion that Kids Company 
should repay the money”.186 Ms Batmanghelidjh, however, stood by her recollection “that 
the Charity Commission explicitly advised Kids Company not to return the money”.187 
115. Although Ms Batmanghelidjh stated that the Charity Commission had told Kids 
Company that “there are no issues in relation to the case,” Mr Shawcross said that the 
case “obviously illustrates a donor who was not looked after properly” and judged that it 
was “the fault of the charity that she was not treated better”.188 Ms Russell explained that 
the Charity Commission concluded that the charity had done nothing illegal, but “there 
is a moral code and culture that transcends here that goes to good governance and good 
practice”.189 
116. Ms Russell stated that the breakdown of the relationship between the donor and 
Kids Company should act as “a timely reminder to all Trustees that they are accountable 
to their donors”.190 Mr Shawcross has pledged to “enhance the [Charity Commission’s] 
advice in terms of…looking after donors properly”.191
117. The conflicting accounts offered by Kids Company and the Charity Commission 
about whether guidance was given about returning a large donation, and the propriety of 
Kids Company’s behaviour in this case is cause for concern. The Charity Commission’s 
resources and existing statutory framework prevent it from intervening in donor 
issues that do not involve illegality – but the Charity Commission has not presented 
any evidence which conveys the disapproval that they have voiced subsequently. We 
are pleased that the Charity Commission will be reviewing their guidance about 
managing relationships with donors. This guidance must better communicate the 
duties of charities towards their donors. 
118. In all communications with charities regarding individual donor complaints, the 
Charity Commission must communicate any advice to a charity in writing, even if there 
has been no illegal activity on the part of a charity.
182 KCI33 (Joan Woolard)
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The role of the Charity Commission
119. Sue Berelowitz, former Deputy Children’s Commissioner, stated that “it is possible 
that I should have contacted the Charity Commission” in relation to her concerns about 
the charity, but “there was not a clear avenue for me to go down”.192 Similarly, Nick Brooks, 
on behalf of the Kids Company auditors, said he “had not considered” reporting the fears 
about the charity’s unsustainability to the Charity Commission but would consider this 
“going forward”.193 
120. It is a matter of some concern that a number of witnesses who had grave concerns 
about the charity did not alert the Charity Commission. As Mr Brooks’s and Ms 
Berelowitz’s comments indicate, the Charity Commission projects too limited a public 
profile to provide much reassurance about charities and their regulation, and to attract 
complaints. If individuals are to understand the role of the Charity Commission, then 
the Charity Commission needs to be seen to be actively holding charities to account. 
121. The Charity Commission must do more to make the public aware that they can and 
should take their concerns about a charity to the Charity Commission. The Commission 
should investigate adverse media reports about a charity and encourage journalists 
to make formal complaints to the Charity Commission, rather than relying upon the 
Charity Commission to chance upon their reports. Its guidance should also urge Trustees 
to make donors, employees and beneficiaries aware that they should complain to the 
Charity Commission if they have serious concerns about the governance of a charity. 
122. The Treasury and Cabinet Office must address the future funding of the Charity 
Commission so that it can carry out its functions in the way that Government, charities 
and the public expects.
123. In order to underline the constitutional status of the Commission’s Board, the 
Commission should restore the proper title of its Board members, so they are known as 
the Charity Commissioners. This would both restore their unique status, and underline 
that the Chair and his fellow commissioners are jointly and severally liable for the 
conduct of the Charity Commission in England and Wales, just as a Chair and other 
Trustees should understand how they are responsible for a charity they govern. 
192 Q528, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
193 Q503, oral evidence, 17,11.2015
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5 Kids Company’s relationship with 
Whitehall
124. Throughout Kids Company’s existence, Ms Batmanghelidjh cultivated her contacts 
with senior politicians. She appeared on platforms with them on several occasions, such 
as with Rt Hon David Cameron MP at the Conservative party conference in 2006. Kids 
Company enjoyed unique, privileged and significant access to senior Ministers and 
Prime Ministers of successive Governments. Part of our inquiry has focused upon the 
relationship between Kids Company and the Government since 2010 but the patterns of 
behaviour pre-date this and some of our comments are equally applicable to previous 
administrations that dealt with the charity.194 This final Chapter builds on the detailed 
examinations of the history of Government funding to Kids Company conducted by the 
National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, and focuses specifically on the 
final grants paid to the charity by central Government during 2015.195 
125. Since 2002, central Government has provided at least £42 million in grants to Kids 
Company.196 Between 2002 and 2005, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the 
Home Office and HM Treasury were involved in funding decisions, but the majority of 
central Government funding (over £22 million) came from the Department for Education 
(DfE) in the form of multi-year grants between 2008 and 2013. 197 In 2013, youth policy, 
including responsibility for administering associated grants, transferred to the Cabinet 
Office. The DfE, Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Communities and 
Local Government, the Department for Health and the Cabinet Office contributed to a 
number of cross-departmental grants to the charity between 2013 and 2015. A number 
of cross-departmental grants to the charity between 2013 and 2015 were contributed to 
by the DfE, the Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Communities and 
Local Government and the Department for Health, as well as by Cabinet Office. 
Correspondence with the Government
126. The NAO outlined the “consistent pattern of behaviour each time Kids Company 
approached the end of a grant term”: if officials resisted new funding commitments, Kids 
Company would warn Ministers and media outlets of the impact of service closures, and 
Ministers would ask officials to review their decisions.198 Tim Loughton, Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for Children and Families in the Department for Education 2010–2012, 
described the approach as “Danegeld…[Ms Batmanghelidjh] was constantly coming 
back for “money or else,” and said that correspondence contained “veiled threats,” which 
“certain people took seriously”.199 Ms Berelowitz criticised the practice of providing funds 
“on the basis that people are using emotive and emotional language about their client 
194 Although Mr Hancock’s and Mr Letwin’s Letter of Direction makes their support for Kids Company a matter of 
public record, Kids Company has received numerous grants from successive administrations (as noted in Appendix B). 
However, it has proved very challenging to establish definitively which former Ministers approved of historic grants 
to the charity. This is partially due to record-keeping policies in some departments where submissions annotated by 
Ministers - amongst other documents - have not been kept.
195 Investigation: the Government’s funding of Kids Company, (NAO, 2015), HC [2015–16] 504
196 A full list of funding provided by central Government throughout successive governments is included in Annex B. 
197 The Department for Education was known as the Department for Education and Skills between 2001 and 2007, and 
the Department for Children, Schools and Families between 2007 and 2010. 
198 Investigation: the Government’s funding of Kids Company, (NAO, 2015) 
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group…or saying that the Government will face a very hard time from the media should 
they not cough up”.200 Mr Letwin also recognised this approach and described it as a 
“conscious strategy” on the part of Kids Company to secure funding.201 While Mr Letwin 
acknowledged that the Government’s response to such requests was not “the right way 
for the Government to relate to any outside body,” he also stated that he knew that Kids 
Company’s warnings of “some massive explosion” were incorrect and denied that such 
claims influenced his decision-making in awarding grants to the charity.202
127. In defending the charity’s hand to mouth existence, Ms Batmanghelidjh and Mr 
Yentob claimed that repeated correspondence with Ministers throughout the charity’s 
existence suggested that regular statutory funding would be forthcoming (see paragraph 
13). We found no evidence of that reassurance in correspondence between Kids Company 
and Ministers in the DfE, Cabinet Office and No. 10, including the Prime Minister. The 
Prime Minister praised the charity and expressed a wish to help Kids Company become 
sustainable, but also warned that future funding from central Government could not be 
guaranteed.203
Relationship with No. 10
128. Kids Company’s relationship with No. 10 under successive governments, and the 
extent to which No. 10’s intervention helped Kids Company to secure funding, has been 
the subject of much media speculation and interest.204 Mr Loughton stated that “people 
like Steven Hilton at No. 10 were always copied in” to letters from Ms Batmanghelidjh and 
various submissions, and that the No. 10 Policy Unit was “holding meetings with Kids 
Company representatives and other local authorities to which I and officials from the DfE, 
as far as I am aware, were not privy”.205 Mr Letwin has confirmed that No. 10 officials and 
special advisors were involved in discussions to secure the cross-departmental 2013–2015 
Government grant.206 
129. While we found no evidence of direct instruction from No 10, the correspondence 
makes clear that the climate was one of favour towards Kids Company. Mr Loughton 
noted that Ms Batmanghelidjh was “was almost the poster girl at the Big Society summit 
that the Prime Minister held in May 2010 within weeks of the election”.207In letters to 
Camila Batmanghelidjh in 2011, 2013 and 2014, the Prime Minister expressed his 
personal support for the charity and stated that he would attempt to follow decisions made 
regarding their funding, having suggested meetings with relevant ministers in the DfE 
and Cabinet Office. Mr Letwin said that he was “well aware, as the whole world is, of [the 
Prime Minister’s] support for Kids Company” and “certainly discussed” Kids Company 
with the Prime Minister.208 However, he maintained that the funding he authorised in 
2015 was “my responsibility. Nobody told me to do it and that is the end of the matter”.209 
200 Q545, oral evidence, 17.11.2015
201 Q739, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
202 Qq677, 707, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
203 Prime Minister letters 08.02.2011, 15.07.2013 and 08.01.2014, Nick Hurd 09.12.2013 (unpublished)
204 E.g. ‘David Cameron mesmerised by Kids Company boss’ (BBC, 05.08.20152015), ‘David Cameron “overruled officials” 
to order Kids Company grant’, (The Telegraph, 04.07.2015), ‘Questions unanswered over No. 10 special treatment for 
Kids Company’ (The Spectator, 02.11.2015)
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130. Mr Loughton, however, suggested that knowledge of the Prime Minister’s support 
may have influenced earlier decisions made in the DfE. He stated that while officials 
may be “trying to do a dispassionate job and produce evidence for Ministers to make 
decisions”, there was also:
quite a lot of noise going on outside the Department about why certain charities 
– in this case Kids Company—are something of a special case and there are 
implications…well beyond the Department if it were to fail.210
131. In his testimony Mr Loughton reported feeling that the high-profile support for Kids 
Company meant that “clearly the pressure is on that this is a charity that needs to be 
looked at a bit more favourably” and called his decision to approve the awarding of a £8.9 
million grant in 2011 a “fait accompli”. 211 
132. Mr Chris Wormald, the Permanent Secretary of the DfE and Mr Richard Heaton, 
the then-Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office, told the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) that they did not feel under political pressure to approve funding to Kids Company.212 
PAC rejected this assertion as “barely plausible”.213.
133. Indeed, the high level of access and favour shown by successive Governments to 
Kids Company created a potentially difficult atmosphere for any criticism of the charity. 
Sue Berelowitz, former deputy Children’s Commissioner for England, stated that the 
knowledge of Kids Company’s high-level support gave her “great pause for thought” when 
considering how best to act on her concerns about the charity. She stated that:
it would have been very challenging to have gone to No. 10 and said, “I am 
concerned” because to take a stand against somebody who was constantly 
telling you about celebrities or relationships with people in the very highest 
places is quite intimidating…it would be difficult to make those kinds of 
representations. Quite frankly, I do not think my voice would have been a good 
counterweight.214
134. She warned that there needed to be “a degree of objectivity” between the Government 
and the leaders of charities, so that “everybody can see that due process has been followed 
and indeed that others aren’t swayed from talking about any concerns they may have 
because of the appearance at the very least of a very, very close relationship”.215
135. In 2013, responsibility for youth policy, including the allocation of associated grants, 
was transferred from the Department for Education to the Cabinet Office. Tim Loughton 
expressed doubts that Kids Company had “any great bearing” on the decision to transfer 
the DfE’s responsibilities for youth funding to the Cabinet Office.216 Instead, he attributed 
the transfer to a “hostility to youth services and youth organisations generally” and 
the fact that “the Secretary of State was not a big fan of having youth services within 
his department”.217 A number of other areas for which Mr Loughton had been the 
210 Q594, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
211 Q582, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
212 Q117, oral evidence to Public Accounts Committee, 02.11.2015
213 HC [2015–16] 504
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responsible Minister “have now been dissipated to at least half a dozen other Government 
Departments”.218 Mr Letwin agreed that it could not “really be the case” that the transfer 
of youth policy was due to doubts expressed about Kids Company within the Department 
for Education, because the “DfE remained an important funder through 2013–14, 2014–
15 and 2015–16”.219 He has since clarified that this transfer occurred because “the National 
Citizen Service (NCS) was already managed out of the Cabinet Office and it was felt that 
it made sense for the two teams to join”, and “the focus of the Department for Education 
Secretary of State had become more towards education rather than Youth Policy”.220 
136. The privileged access to Ministers, numerous ‘special grants’ and exemption from 
usual reporting processes appear to have distorted the expectations of the charity’s 
leadership and undermined the warnings issued by Government that funding might 
not continue. In allowing an unconventional relationship and funding process to 
develop, successive governments left themselves vulnerable to misunderstandings – 
wilful or otherwise – on the part of the charity, about the level of support that Kids 
Company could expect to receive from Government in the future. 
137. Ms Batmanghelidjh and Kids Company appeared to captivate some of the most 
senior political figures in the land, by the force of the Chief Executive’s personality as 
much as by the spin and profile she generated for the charity. As a consequence, objective 
judgements about Kids Company were set aside. The Government’s relationship with 
Kids Company was forged outside the usual decision-making processes of Whitehall 
departments and there is little doubt that the high profile support of successive Prime 
Ministers for Kids Company had an impact upon decision-making across Whitehall. 
This included the authorisation of multiple grants outside of the normal competitive 
process. We also question whether it was wise to move youth funding from the 
Department for Education into the Cabinet Office. Had that not occurred, it is possible 
that less money would have gone to Kids Company and more to other, perhaps better 
run, youth charities. Other charities have said that they are angry and cynical about 
how one or two charities gain unfair advantage, and that the approach of successive 
Governments towards Kids Company has damaged their confidence in Government. 
138. It is also a matter of considerable concern that the knowledge of the high-level 
political patronage enjoyed by Kids Company may have deterred other individuals 
from coming forward with concerns about the charity. 
139. We concur with the Public Accounts Committee’s recommendation that, at the very 
least, if the Government decides to use special powers to grant funding, it should provide 
a transparent case for its decision and report regularly on the use of these powers. 
Ministers and Government departments must deploy proven methods of assessment and 
co-ordinate these effectively, and exercise objective judgement when deciding whether 
to grant taxpayers’ money to charities. 
218 Q622, oral evidence, 19.11.2015. In a subsequent note to the Committee, Mr Loughton has outlined the other areas 
that were once within his remit as Minister but now sit with other Government departments. These include: Child 
Protection (partly transferred to the Home Office); Child Sexual Exploitation (the lead cross-Government Minister 
is now in Home Office); Youth Justice (now with Ministry of Justice); Troubled Families (now with the Department 
for Communities and Local Government), Internet Safety and Cyberbullying (now largely with the Department for 
Culture Media and Sport).
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140. When allocating funding to charities, Ministers should not risk creating the 
perception that they are overriding official advice on the basis of personal prejudice 
or political considerations. In circumstances where they disagree with official advice 
regarding the release of grants to a particular charity, Ministers, including Prime 
Ministers, should consider whether such disagreement arises from a conflict of interest. 
If a conflict could be judged to exist, the Minister or Ministers must recuse themselves 
from decision-making, including from any influence over any other Ministers making 
those decisions. Ministers should not allow charity representatives to exploit their 
access to Government in a way that may be unethical. There must be no suggestion that 
individual Ministers have funds under their personal control or are exercising personal 
patronage. 
141. It should be for the relevant departments to control grants to charities, not the 
Cabinet Office or another department that does not have direct policy responsibility for 
the sector in question. As the Cabinet Office is the department most closely under the 
Prime Minister’s control, the existing structure leaves the Prime Minister exposed to the 
kind of pressures which Kids Company thought it could exert.
142. Government should re-evaluate the standard process by which grant decisions 
benefiting charities can be made following input from a number of different departments. 
This review should consider the creation of an account manager to oversee all funding 
decisions for each charity. This would enable greater continuity and accountability 
than seen in the case of Kids Company, which was passed between several departments 
throughout its existence. 
143. The Government should consider whether sufficient safeguards are in place to 
ensure that the Libor Fund is administered in line with these principles of objectivity 
and transparency.
Government monitoring
144. Kids Company has not had to compete for a grant since 2013.221 Despite extensive 
Ministerial support, the Government had little evidence on which to base judgements 
about the value of Kids Company’s work; the Government had been heavily reliant on 
Kids Company’s self-assessments, and monitoring of grants had historically focused more 
upon outputs than outcomes.222 Mr Loughton told the Committee that Kids Company 
“appeared to have a lower threshold of proof in order to get money from public funds” than 
other charities, and Ms Berelowitz expressed surprise that the funding bodies, particularly 
the Government, “were not requiring much more detailed audits and satisfying themselves 
that the money was spent for the purposes for which it was intended,” given the large 
grants awarded to Kids Company. 223
145. Mr Loughton stated that he was “sure [Kids Company] did some good work for some 
people, but whether it justified the amount of money, we never had the evidence to back 
that up”.224 Mr Letwin acknowledged the Government’s failure to measure the charity’s 
outcomes, but hoped that the conditions attached to the April 2015 grant would enable the 
221 Investigation: The Government’s funding of Kids Company, (NAO, 2015)
222 Q28 [Chris Wormald], oral evidence to Public Accounts Committee, 02.11.2015
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224 Q573, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
42 The collapse of Kids Company
Government to find out “a year or two later whether [Kids Company] was actually doing 
the good work that I believe, underneath all these problems, it was doing”.225
146. Without robust evidence, the Government had no way of knowing whether Kids 
Company was delivering more effective or better value interventions than any other 
charity, despite the fact that it received considerably more funding than other charities - 
including those operating nationally - in each funding round.226 Mr Loughton said that 
“there were very serious concerns about how effective that money was compared with that 
for other groups,” despite Kids Company receiving “by far the lion’s share” of funding 
between 2011 and 2014.227 He stated that:
there were other youth organisations doing some very good work with some 
equally traumatised and damaged children and young people that were 
producing all sorts of performance indicators, and more importantly actually 
producing the children to be able to tell us their story as well.228
147. Dr Maitland Hudson also believed that “one of the greatest difficulties in assessing 
Kids Company’s value for money has been the absence of shared indicators that would 
allow for a reasonable comparison of its work with that of other providers”.229
148. Mr Letwin, who has been a vocal supporter of the charity since 2002, stated that he 
“never believed the numbers” Kids Company claimed to be working with, and said that 
“there was a distinct gap between the claims for the numbers that were going on in public 
and what was really happening”.230 Rather than the 19,000 children the charity claimed to 
be working with in schools, Mr Letwin believed that Kids Company was instead “covering 
about 10,000 children” in schools, but acknowledged that “covering” children is “very 
different from looking after individual children”.231 He believes that Ms Batmanghelidjh 
“conflated a whole series of different figures in order to get the biggest possible figure and 
to give an impression that went beyond what it looks like when you look at the detail”.232 
Despite these concerns, however, Mr Letwin stated that his “personal and direct experience 
of talking to the kids involved and seeing what was going on” in 2001–2003 reassured him 
that the charity was doing valuable work. 233 This was more than 12 years ago.
149. It is astounding that it was only in 2015, by which point Kids Company had received 
over £35 million from central Government, that the Government acknowledged the 
need for a robust examination of the charity’s activities and outcomes. Given that 
doubts were reportedly raised about Kids Company in the DfE, we also question the 
quality of co-ordination between Government departments, following the transfer of 
youth policy. 
150.  Evidence that former employees have submitted to this inquiry has highlighted 
the charity’s dependency on selective case studies to evidence its impact. While case-
225 Q642, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
226 In the 2011–2013 Voluntary and Community Sector grant, for example, Kids Company received more than double 
that of the next highest charity (Barnado’s, which operated nationally). Investigation: the Government’s Funding of 
Kids Company, (NAO, 2015)
227 Q572, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
228 Q572, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
229 KCI31, (Genevieve Maitland Hudson)
230 Q634, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
231 Q634, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
232 Q637, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
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studies may have a role to play in illustrating a charity’s work, wider evidence of 
impact is required. This is particularly true for charities in receipt of large amounts 
of Government money. We struggle to see on what basis successive Governments and 
other grant-giving bodies, and indeed the charity’s Trustees, satisfied themselves of 
the appropriateness of support given to clients, and the value of the charity’s high 
resource model. 
151. It is unacceptable that successive Ministers appear to have released funds on 
the basis of little more than their relationship with a charismatic leader, small-scale 
studies and anecdotes, and no more than two visits made by Mr Letwin more than 10 
years previously. Releasing Kids Company from the usual competitive grant processes 
to which other charities are subject, despite a lack of evidence about the efficacy 
of its model or any evaluation of outcomes, has been proved to be an unjustifiable 
way to conduct Government business and to handle public money. This approach is 
condemned by the fact of Kids Company’s failure and is therefore unjustifiable in the 
future.
152. Government doubted that the information that Kids Company was circulating 
regarding its client number was true, but did nothing to correct the record. Instead, it 
continued to grant funding despite that knowledge. 
153. We agree with the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC’s) recommendation that 
the Government should undertake a fundamental review of how it makes direct and 
non-competitive grants to the voluntary sector.234 In addition to the areas the PAC 
recommends for consideration, we see the creation of a measurement framework for 
the social sector as essential to this. The use of standardised measurement tools will 
enable more accurate assessments of the value of activity, and enable meaningful 
comparisons to take place during grant bidding and monitoring. Identifying a charity’s 
outcomes, rather than simply its outputs, and benchmarking these in relation to other 
organisations in the sector should be a core part of any funding decision. 
154. We also agree with the recommendations made by the PAC that the Government 
should improve the way it monitors and evaluates the performance of grant-funded 
organisations.235
155. If the Government is funding an organisation that provides services such as therapy 
or education, it must satisfy itself that these services are being delivered by people who 
are sufficiently qualified to be doing so. For example, a number of local authorities, 
amongst them Southwark Council, no longer commission Alternative Provision 
Education from providers that are not registered with Ofsted. Central Government 
should similarly consider making external inspection from the relevant regulatory body 
(e.g. CQC or Ofsted) a condition of commissioning, so that it can be sure of the quality 
of services being delivered. 
156. The Government should insist that charities to which it provides grants provide 
legally defensible contingency plans. This would help to mitigate the risks of a charity 
with vulnerable beneficiaries folding unexpectedly.236 
234 Recommendation (i), HC [2015–16] 504
235 Recommendation 8 (iii), HC [2015–16] 504
236 The NAO has also pointed to the benefit of developing contingency plans to deal with provider failure in ‘Principles 
Paper: Managing Provider Failure’ (NAO, 2015)
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Government’s use of professional services
157. Kingston Smith, PKF Littlejohn and PwC representatives all denied that their reviews 
of the charity indicate that Kids Company was well run. Nevertheless, these reviews 
have all been cited by the Cabinet Office as providing a degree of assurance about the 
effectiveness of the charity’s governance or operations. 
158. Information about the charity was reported in a piecemeal fashion across various 
reviews that actually offered little or no assurance about the effectiveness of Kids 
Company’s governance. They were read selectively to gain confirmation of a pre-
existing and positive picture of the charity. Government must learn lessons about its 
use of such reviews, and co-ordinate its activities.
PKF Littlejohn
159. As outlined in paragraph 87, PKF Littlejohn explicitly stated that “an assessment 
of the effectiveness of [governance] policies and procedures was outside the scope of 
our review”.237 However Mr Letwin indicated that the Cabinet Office did in fact take 
assurances about the effectiveness of the charity’s governance from this report. He said 
he was “relying on” the PKF Littlejohn review to highlight problems in the governance of 
the charity as “what I had before me was the report that is called a review of ‘financial and 
governance controls,’ so I read it that way.” He stated that the review indicated that Kids 
Company’s governance and controls were “reasonably okay within the limits of a charity” 
and did not reveal “that actually the charity was grossly financially mismanaged”.238
160. The scope of the PFK Littlejohn review became limited to the point where the 
final report to the Cabinet Office provided none of the information needed to assess 
the governance of the charity. It is of particular concern that, when making funding 
decisions, a Minister took assurances from the report that the report did not offer. 
161. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, examine the process by which it 
commissions reviews to ensure that it receives the information it requires. It is essential 
to ensure that the commissioning process does not allow drift from the original scope. 
Consideration should be given to requiring successful contractors to outline explicitly 
what level of assurance on specific issues the Government will be able to take from their 
final report.
162. The Government was right to attempt to assess the governance of a charity before 
awarding funds. However, rather than commissioning a review of a charity’s policies and 
processes from one of the usual outside firms, the Government should develop its own 
Civil Service capability in order to exercise its own judgement about whether a charity’s 
governance, quality of decision-making, objective setting and culture are effective, and 
if its internal controls are sufficient. There should be particular caution towards Boards 
in which Trustees have held their position for more than two terms, and towards Boards 
where no individuals have experience in the charity’s particular area of delivery. 
237 KCI21 (PKF Littlejohn)
238 Q714, oral evidence 19.11.2015
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Kingston Smith
163. Mr Brooks judged that Kids Company had “always been living on a knife edge, which 
is in my view portrayed quite clearly through the notes to the accounts”.239 Mr Letwin, 
however, stated he “didn’t get from the audit reports…that actually the charity was grossly 
financially mismanaged” when he examined the accounts in April.240 He acknowledged 
that the Government would “need to look at the whole question of how audit reports and 
other reports are used by public agencies”.241
164. This inquiry should provide a reminder to all whose use charity accounts that a 
clear audit report gives no indication that the charity is well-managed or any assurance 
that charitable funds are being used wisely and in accordance with the stated purposes 
of the charity. Charity Trustees also have an obligation to be accountable to their 
donors. 
165. The Government must not rely upon audited accounts being signed off as a going 
concern as any assurance that a charity is financially well-managed or well-governed. 
At the very least, Government must request sight of a charity’s management letters, and 
should seek direct assurance from the charity’s auditors.
166. When commissioning external audits or reviews, Government should give priority 
to contractors with specific experience of the relevant field (e.g. of children’s services) so 
that meaningful benchmarking can take place. 
PwC
167. Cabinet Office’s written evidence confirms that it was “waiting for the preliminary 
findings from some allegations made by ex-employees of Kids Company which the Charity 
Commission were looking into” before authorising a £4.265 million grant on 28 July.242 
Oliver Letwin clarified that the funding was not contingent upon PwC’s findings, but 
on whether the Charity Commission would be opening a statutory inquiry on the basis 
of the preliminary report; it would not be possible to authorise payment to a body under 
statutory inquiry.243 
168. The Charity Commission decided not to open a statutory inquiry on the basis of the 
preliminary findings, but did advise the Cabinet Office that the report “was not a clean 
bill of health and we still had concerns about the prudence…and the legitimacy of some 
of the spend”.244 Nevertheless, Mr Letwin stated that “the fact that PwC had brought to 
light yet more examples of financial mismanagement was…not decisive for my decision” 
to release the grant as he was already aware that “the charity was being grossly financially 
mismanaged” and had plans to replace the charity’s management.245 
169. We are concerned that the Cabinet Office was prepared to hand over money, on a 
Minister’s say so against official advice, to an organisation in which serious allegations 
had not been fully investigated. We are not convinced by Mr Letwin’s assertion that the 
239 Q484, oral evidence, 17.11.2015 
240 Q714, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
241 Q782, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
242 KCI3 (Cabinet Office)
243 Q775, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
244 Q490, oral evidence, 03.11.2015
245 Q777, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
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planned changes to the charity’s leadership rendered the allegations under investigation 
irrelevant. It was an error for the Government to release a second “final” grant to a 
charity with a history of financial mismanagement, and in which the new Trustees and, 
as yet unidentified, permanent CEO had not yet proved their competence or commitment 
to making serious changes to the organisation’s ethos and practices. We recommend that 
in future no department should hand over money to an organisation in which serious 
allegations have not been fully investigated. 
April 2015 grant
170. In April 2015, the Cabinet Office authorised a one-off payment of £4.265 million to 
Kids Company. Mr Letwin stated that this grant was paid up front because if Cabinet Office 
“had not given it that money it would have then become insolvent,” but argued that the 
attached conditions, such as the end-to-end business review, would get the charity “into a 
position where it did not come back for more”.246 The grant agreement also stipulated that 
the April grant would be the final grant paid to the charity in 2015. 
171. Mr Letwin stated that, had he known the extent to which the charity was mismanaged, 
he would not have paid the entirety of the April grant up front. He told the Committee 
that, although he recognised the precariousness of Kids Company’s financial situation in 
April, he:
had before me documentary evidence about its so-called financial management 
in the form of audit reports and the PKF Littlejohn report...I studied those 
things carefully. I could not see any sign from that that this thing was 
exceptionally financially mismanaged, so I thought it was worth trying to get 
it on to a stable footing.247
172. Mr Heaton and Mr Letwin both stated that Cabinet Office worked with the charity’s 
auditors when deciding whether to pay the entirety of the April £4.265 million grant 
upfront.248 Mr Brooks initially stated that he could not recall having any such conversations 
with Cabinet Office regarding the April grant. He has since stated that the conversation 
“would have taken place” but would “have been very brief as I made no file note so it could 
not have seemed to me of substance or controversial”.249 
173. The Cabinet Office Ministers’ faith in Kids Company’s commitment to move to 
a sustainable operating model was misplaced. This was demonstrated by the charity 
returning to request additional funding six weeks later. The decision to pay the full 
amount of the April grant in one lump sum, rather than waiting for fulfilment of any 
of the grant conditions, was not conducive to accountability. The April grant was one 
more example of the Government providing emergency funding to enable the charity 
to manage its cash flow, outside of any competitive or evidence-driven process. It failed 
to deliver any of the desired outcomes. 
246 Q656, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
247 Q711, oral evidence, 19.11.2015
248 Q38, [Richard Heaton], oral evidence [to PAC], 02.11.2015. Q712 [Mr Letwin] oral evidence [to PACAC], 19.11.2015. 
249 Mr Brooks clarified this in a follow-up note to the Committee. 
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Ministerial Direction 2015
174. Having received the £4.265 million 2015–16 grant in April, Alan Yentob met Rt 
Hon Iain Duncan Smith, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, and Oliver Letwin 
on 22 May to request immediate short term funding and a firm commitment to future 
significant statutory support. Mr Letwin also personally spoke to Mr Yentob about this 
issue while “sitting in a car in my constituency on the car phone”.250 When faced with 
Mr Yentob’s assertion that Kids Company would “go bust almost immediately” without 
an immediate grant from the Government, Mr Letwin said he “did not find it difficult 
to make [an] objective assessment” and told Mr Yentob “so be it”. 251 Mr Letwin stated 
that the charity could “give no proper account of why they had failed so dismally to raise 
the private financing that they had expected to raise in the interim” and claimed that 
this convinced him that the existing management at the charity had “no idea what was 
actually going on”.252 
175. Despite the Government’s initial refusal to provide a grant, Kids Company Trustees 
subsequently approached Mr Letwin with a restructuring plan in June, and requested 
£3 million Government funding to support this. The plan included proposals to reduce 
operating costs by 40% by Q4 2015 (including reducing workforce by 50%), appoint a new 
Chief Executive, and appoint four new Trustees. Mr Heaton told the Public Accounts 
Committee that this “bold restructuring proposal” was something he “could not sign up 
to, or…advise Ministers to sign up to,” as he did not believe that “Kids Company [would] 
successfully implement the changes they describe in their new restructuring plans while 
meeting the stringent conditions set out in the proposed new grant”.253 Mr Heaton’s 
assessment of the situation was that: 
for it to succeed, it required the chief executive to step to one side; the Trustee 
board to be replaced; management to have the grip to downsize an organisation, 
which is hard work and difficult; and no drop-off in philanthropic funding. 
It would require all those things to come to pass for the restructuring to be 
successful, and I did not think the probability was high enough to justify 
public money.254
176. Mr Letwin noted that the money to be raised from private funding would drop from 
£17 million to £10 million, but called Mr Heaton’s assessment “an absolutely accurate 
description” otherwise. 255 
177. By June, Kids Company had not met any of the conditions of the April grant. Rather 
than producing a contingency plan (due mid-April) for Cabinet Office, Kids Company 
only submitted a high level summary of savings by department and, “despite repeated 
requests” from Cabinet Office, did not share its management accounts and forecasts on a 
monthly basis, as had been agreed. The necessary end-to-end business review due in mid-
May was never started, despite the Cabinet Office providing “comprehensive feedback” on 
Kids Company’s scoping document, and Kids Company did not deliver on the condition 
250 Q680, oral evidence, 19.11.2015.
251 Q680, oral evidence, 19.11.2015.
252 Qq685, 688, oral evidence, 19.11.2015.
253 Q55, oral evidence to PAC, 02.11.2015. Mr Heaton also laid out his objections to the grant in his request for Ministerial 
Direction. 
254 Q55, oral evidence to PAC, 02.11.2015
255 Q774, oral evidence 19.11.2015
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to “develop, roll out and implement the measurement of value for money and impact” 
(although this was to be carried out over the whole grant period). 256 
178. Nevertheless, Mr Letwin and Mr Hancock’s letter of direction stated that they took 
“confidence from the changes that Kids Company has undertaken to make in terms of its 
leadership, management and governance, which we judge do give it a realistic prospect of 
long-term viability”.257 
179. In neither his letter of direction nor his oral evidence has Mr Letwin provided 
convincing justification for his and Mr Hancock’s decision to ignore the comprehensive 
advice of senior officials, whose concerns Mr Letwin acknowledged as accurate and 
valid. This grant should not have been authorised contrary to advice. 
180. After the letter of direction was issued, there was a period of around one month 
before the £3 million grant was paid to Kids Company. The Cabinet Office explained 
that during this time it was reviewing the evidence of income that Kids Company had 
included in their revised cash flow, agreeing the details of the grant conditions with Kids 
Company, and seeking evidence of Kids Company’s commitment to these. The Cabinet 
Office was also waiting for the preliminary findings from the allegations made by the ex-
employees of Kids Company which the Charity Commission were looking into.258
181. Mr Yentob stated that “an hour and a half” after the Government funds arrived in 
Kids Company’s account, the charity was notified of allegations of sexual abuse.259 By 
this point, Trustees had authorised payment of salaries using the Government grant, but 
philanthropists had not yet paid the £3 million that was due to match the Government’s 
commitment. Mr Yentob said that the allegations received led him to conclude that “it 
was quite impossible to carry on doing this, nor did I want the philanthropists to put their 
money into something that was going to be insolvent when they could set up another 
charity and look after those children”.260 He therefore advised the philanthropists not 
to put their money into the charity, and the charity’s Trustees declared Kids Company 
insolvent on 5 August 2015. Mr Letwin commented that, had it not been for these sexual 
abuse allegations, his decision to make the final grant payment “might well have turned 
out, in practice, to have been an abundant success”.261
182.  We questioned Mr Letwin about why the Government did not wait until the 
philanthropists had paid the agreed £3 million before transferring public money, or insist 
that both grants were paid into an escrow account. Mr Letwin stated that he did not feel 
this was necessary because he had “a written undertaking” that the funds would be coming 
the next day.262 Mr Letwin stated that, as the new financial controller had concluded that 
the charity would be unable to raise the necessary £10 million a year it required, the use 
of an escrow account “would not have made any difference to the question of whether the 
charity went bust when it did. Had they put their £3 million in, there would simply be £6 
million sitting there”.263
256 KCI3 (Cabinet Office)
257 Letter of Direction, 29.06.2015
258 KCI3 (Cabinet Office)
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183. We do not share Mr Letwin’s confidence that the restructuring of Kids Company 
“might well have turned out, in practice, to have been an abundant success” were 
it not for the allegations of sexual abuse that emerged later. As the new Finance 
Director had only been in place for a matter of weeks and the new Chief Executive 
had not been appointed, there was insufficient evidence that the new leadership could 
transform the organisation’s business model and activities. Our understanding of 
Ms Batmanghelidjh’s dominant role in dictating the charity’s direction, despite not 
holding a Trustee position, and her historic refusal to shrink the organisation make 
us doubtful about whether the new role of ‘President’ would significantly curtail the 
influence by which she had hitherto controlled the organisation. Equally, the fact that 
the Chair of Trustees, who had condoned the excessive spending and unsustainable 
model over a period of 12 years, was to remain on the Board of Trustees for the 
foreseeable future makes us question the impact that the changes to the charity’s 
leadership would actually have had.
184. The Government Ministers’ willingness to pay £3 million to the charity before 
receiving the matched funding from philanthropists was unwise and represents a 
failure in the responsibility Ministers should take for handling taxpayers’ money. Had 
the Cabinet Office insisted that the money from philanthropists was received before 
Government made payment, or insisted that both sources of funding were held in an 
escrow, this would have considerably increased the likelihood of public money being 
returned. As it was, £1 million had already been spent by the charity, and it is still 
unknown whether the remaining £2 million of public money can be reclaimed.
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Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. Kids Company was by no means the only charity serving this client group, and 
many other varied charities are delivering vital support for young people without 
the high profile enjoyed by Kids Company. The failure and public criticisms of 
Kids Company must not be allowed to taint the whole charitable sector; we have 
no reason to doubt that the majority of Trustees and charities act responsibly and 
in accordance with their charitable purposes. Equally, discussions about “gaps” 
in statutory provision and Kids Company’s vocal criticism of statutory provision 
throughout the inquiry must not overshadow the exceptional work done by many 
dedicated individuals working within statutory services. (Paragraph 8)
2. Kids Company did provide valuable support to many vulnerable young people, 
albeit the evidence shows that this was on a considerably smaller scale than it 
claimed in its publications and annual reports. The failures in governance that led to 
the collapse of the charity should not detract from the commitment and hard work 
of many highly dedicated individuals working in the organisation. Submissions 
from former employees document the range of services that was offered by the 
charity - from material assistance, to educational provision and parental support 
- and we have reviewed a large number of evaluations that highlight the charity’s 
vulnerable client base. We note that some of those connected with Kids Company 
are seeking to continue three of its programmes through a new charity, 1UP, in 
the hope of continuing some of the projects judged to be amongst Kids Company’s 
most successful. We hope that the Trustees of 1UP will build upon the best of Kids 
Company’s programmes and provide effective and sustainable support to those 
people Kids Company sought to serve. (Paragraph 9)
3.  Kids Company’s most positive legacy is the dialogue to which it contributed about 
the need to improve support for vulnerable children and young people. The message 
the charity consistently promoted - that children and young people must be valued, 
trusted and supported with compassion - must not be lost amid the questions about 
the collapse of the charity and the criticism about the propriety and efficacy of some 
of its methods. (Paragraph 10)
Governance of Kids Company
4. Kids Company’s demand-led operating model - based on the doctrine that no child 
should be turned away - carried the constant risk that the charity would not be able 
to ensure that its commitments would be matched by its resources. The charity’s 
Trustees failed to address this risk. Instead, the Chief Executive and Trustees relied 
upon wishful thinking and false optimism and became inured to the precariousness 
of the charity’s financial situation. (Paragraph 13)
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5. Kids Company had 19 years of statutory audits, but the charity was wrong to take 
comfort from this. The charity was signed off as a going concern, but the auditors 
repeated warnings about the precariousness of its finances and the dependency of 
the charity upon future Government grants. In any case, statutory accounts are 
audited and published long after the event and do not show the current state of a 
charity’s finances. (Paragraph 21)
6. The Charity Commission’s guidance warns that Trustees must avoid exposing the 
charity’s assets, beneficiaries or reputation to undue risk and take care not to over-
commit the charity. Kids Company relied on a hand-to-mouth existence and by 
refusing to prioritise the building of any significant reserves, the Trustees failed 
to exercise this duty of care towards the charity’s clients, employees and donors. 
(Paragraph 22)
Cash flow
7. Several Ministers authorised unorthodox payments (in the form of early Government 
grants and direct grants) despite knowledge of the charity’s significant cash flow 
difficulties (see Appendix B for full list of payments made to Kids Company over 
successive Governments). In one case, funding was given despite the unequivocal 
assessment by HMRC that the charity’s model was not viable. By continuing to 
fund the charity’s cash flow crises, successive Governments gave tacit approval 
to an unsustainable and inadequate business model and eroded any incentive 
for Kids Company to address its own governance and management failings. This 
continued Government support at moments of crisis nurtured the expectations of 
Kids Company that it could continue to rely on Government to prop up its finances. 
(Paragraph 25)
How many clients did Kids Company really help?
8. It has proved impossible to reconcile Kids Company’s claims about its caseload with 
evidence from other sources. The evidence is that the figures were significantly over-
inflated. This casts doubt on Kids Company’s claims that overwhelming demand, 
rather than financial mismanagement, lay at the root of its financial difficulties. In 
addition, the charity’s practice of calculating ‘reach’, for example in counting a whole 
class of children as clients if they benefited from work with an individual student, was 
misleading to donors. Trustees were either ignorant of this exaggeration or simply 
accepted it, because it helped to promote the charity’s fundraising. (Paragraph 35)
9. If it is correct that Kids Company was unable to refer its vulnerable clients to the local 
authority once the charity closed, given the locking up of all relevant files, this may 
be a serious consequence of Kids Company’s failure to co-operate with Southwark 
Council when planning for a potential closure earlier in the year (see paragraph 155 
for recommendation to the Government). Had the charity co-operated earlier in the 
process, it is likely that full referrals could have been completed and all vulnerable 
people provided with support. Kids Company’s lack of co-operation thwarted 
contingency planning and was highly irresponsible. The list of 15,933 “high clients” 
provided to Southwark Council and the Committee did not assist the local authority, 
or the Committee, in assessing true need or caseload. (Paragraph 36)
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Regulation
10. Ms Batmanghelidjh’s account of Ofsted’s inspection of the Bristol facilities differs 
considerably from the evidence that Ofsted submitted to the inquiry. The Trustees 
should have been aware of Ofsted’s concerns about the Bristol facilities and taken 
action in consequence. Either this information was withheld from the Trustees or 
they simply failed to act on it in the ten months between Ofsted’s two inspections. 
This indicates a serious breakdown of proper governance. (Paragraph 40)
11. There are a number of safeguarding issues which have come to PACAC’s attention 
during the conduct of this inquiry into Kids Company, most of which neither a select 
committee, nor the Charity Commission, nor a Government department could be 
expected to resolve. There is therefore a strong case for statutory regulation of charities 
who have safeguarding responsibilities for children or vulnerable adults and we 
recommend that the Government considers how such regulators as Ofsted and the 
Care Quality Commission can assume these responsibilities as quickly as possible (see 
paragraph 155). (Paragraph 41)
Quality of services
12. Kids Company did a lot of valuable work with some very vulnerable clients, and had 
many extremely dedicated and committed staff. We have had many accounts that 
employees were inspired and motivated by the quality of support they could deliver 
to young people, and delivered personalised and effective interventions. Given this, 
it is both sad and disappointing that robust evaluation of the outcomes of Kids 
Company’s work is lacking. Without strong evidence of impact and outcomes on 
a wider scale than small samples or individual case studies, it is difficult to see on 
what basis Kids Company’s Trustees satisfied themselves of the appropriateness 
of support given to clients, and the value for money offered by the charity’s high 
resource model. That the charity invested so little in highlighting and evaluating the 
outcomes of its work, despite spending considerable funds on research, gives rise to 
suspicion in many. This approach left the Trustees unable to defend the reputation of 
Kids Company, which is a prime obligation of the good governance and leadership 
of any organisation. (Paragraph 47)
Internal controls
13. Many of Kids Company’s clients experienced extremely difficult, and in some cases 
traumatic, circumstances, and the unorthodox spending has been put into this 
context. However, the significant costs incurred to provide luxury items to particular 
individuals diverted charitable funds from other projects and programmes that had 
the potential to provide more long-term and effective support to a wider group of 
young people. Such lavish spending was inappropriate, unwise and irresponsible, 
and did not represent a proper use of charitable funds. Given the charity’s known 
cash flow problems, including its difficulties in meeting its payroll and obligations 
to HMRC, the authorisation of such payments was in defiance of the reality of Kids 
Company’s financial position and duties to clients. With a complete lack of experience 
of youth services amongst Trustees, it was impossible for the Board to assess the 
appropriateness of significant expenditure that Ms Batmanghelidjh justified on 
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the basis of clinical judgements. It is nevertheless extraordinary that Trustees were 
content to accept this without more rigorous examination. (Paragraph 55)
Safeguarding
14. Kids Company’s handling of an allegation about a very serious failure of safeguarding 
was inadequate and irresponsible. It is not appropriate for a known supporter of Kids 
Company to conduct a supposedly independent investigation, and that confidential 
information about an employee’s personal circumstances were used to assess her 
credibility, without transparency about where the information had come from, or 
permission being given for it to be shared. This represents a serious failure on the 
part of Trustees to ensure the existence and observance of appropriate processes 
for handling allegations relating to the safeguarding of vulnerable young people. 
(Paragraph 59)
Board of Trustees
15. There is no evidence that Trustees were involved in the decision to turn down 
the philanthropist’s offer of significant financial and human resource. At the 
time the offer was made and rejected, Trustees were attempting to manage a £4 
million deficit and secure an additional £12 million grant from the Government. 
Ms Batmanghelidjh’s citing of mere intuition about an individual’s supposed lack 
of emotional authenticity as justification for blocking the exploration of a new 
partnership at a time of extreme financial difficulty underlines how unaccountable 
and dominant Trustees had allowed her to become, and how far she was able to 
insist on maintaining personal control. (Paragraph 66)
16. A charity of Kids Company’s size and complexity requires a Board of Trustees that 
will demonstrate leadership, judgement and a willingness to challenge assumptions. 
There was a lack of relevant Trustee expertise in the field of youth services or 
psychotherapy, although we understand that attempts, albeit belated, were underway 
to recruit a Trustee with such experience in the run up to the charity’s collapse. The 
admiration that Kids Company’s Trustees had for Ms Batmanghelidjh’s apparent 
vision and fundraising capabilities led to a false confidence about other areas of the 
organisation. The Charity Commission’s guidance to Trustees warns that Trustees 
should not allow their judgement to be swayed by personal prejudices or dominant 
personalities, but this is what occurred in Kids Company. This resulted in Trustees 
suspending their usual critical faculties – particularly over Ms Batmanghelidjh’s 
insistence on the demand-led business model, her exercise of substantial discretionary 
spending powers, the effectiveness of internal controls, and the quality of clinical 
judgements and safeguarding procedures. The length of the Chief Executive and 
Chair’s tenures were not conducive to challenging the Chief Executive herself. There 
was a clear link between the failure to correct serious weaknesses in the organisation, 
and the failure to refresh its leadership. (Paragraph 68)
17. Mr Yentob denied historic failures in financial management and insisted that there 
were no questions about the financial resilience of Kids Company until 2014. Given 
the charity’s historic hand-to-mouth existence, its continual failure to build up 
reserves, significant periods on the brink of insolvency and its inability to meet 
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its obligations to HMRC, this is an inaccurate and alarming interpretation. The 
evidence Mr Yentob gave to the Committee suggests a lack of proper attention to 
his duties as Chair of Trustees and a continuing inability to recognise those failures. 
With his fellow Trustees he was unwilling or unable to impose sufficient control. 
Together, they failed to exercise their proper function as Trustees. (Paragraph 69)
18. Mr Yentob acknowledges his poor judgement in respect of his position at the BBC 
during the summer of 2015. His actions were unwise at best, and deliberately 
intimidating at worst. He has since resigned his main position at the BBC but he still 
retains substantial responsibilities within the organisation and oversees substantial 
budgets. It is not within the remit of this Committee to comment on the governance 
of the BBC, but the proper governance of conflicts of interest and standards of 
behaviour – particularly amongst its senior executives – is a very serious matter 
for any reputable organisation. That a senior figure could act in this way and it 
could take so long for action to be taken reflects poorly on the BBC’s leadership. 
(Paragraph 70)
Kingston Smith LLP
19. Kingston Smith has offered no credible explanation for changing the warnings 
of insolvency from those issued by the preceding auditors. Mr Brooks stated that 
Kingston Smith’s softer language still indicated that Kids Company was “living on 
a knife-edge.” It is surprising that Kingston Smith did not consider its duty to alert 
the Charity Commission to the extremely high risk of failure in this charity, in 
accordance with its duty as charity auditors under Section 156 of the Charities Act 
2011. We note that this is a lesson that Mr Brooks appeared to accept under our 
examination, but this lesson should be learned by the audit profession as a whole. 
(Paragraph 77)
20. It is regrettable that, in over three years of auditing the charity, Kingston Smith’s 
sampling method failed to uncover any of the issues that have since emerged regarding 
the charity’s expenditure and internal controls. Kingston Smith appeared to be 
over-confident in the charity’s internal controls. This in turn may have influenced 
the sampling process and the level of scrutiny to which the charity was subject. For 
a charity that the auditors acknowledged was “unorthodox”, particular vigilance in 
identifying the audit risks and sampling size should have been especially important. 
In addition, the failure of Kids Company’s Trustees to respond to recommendations 
repeatedly laid out in management letters suggest that Kingston Smith’s confidence 
in the charity’s management was misplaced. (Paragraph 82)
21. Kingston Smith did not consider it part of its remit to assure the public of whether 
Kids Company spent money in line with its charitable objectives. Ultimately, 
discretion over appropriate spending rests with the charity’s Trustees, not the 
auditors or the Charity Commission. This inquiry provides a reminder to all who 
use charity accounts that a set of audited accounts do not provide assurance that 
charitable funds are being used wisely or that a charity is well run. (Paragraph 83)
22. Ms Batmanghelidjh’s use of the fact that the charity had 19 years of clear audits, 
while true, is also disingenuous. Each time the charity’s accounts were signed off 
as a going concern, the auditors issued significant warnings to the charity about 
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the precariousness of its demand-led operating model and the dependency of the 
charity upon future grants and emergency funding. However opaque the language, 
the meaning should have been clear enough to the Trustees and CEO. Such repeated 
warnings should have led to a change to the reserves policy, contingency planning 
for insolvency and substantial downsizing many years before the final crisis. 
(Paragraph 84)
PKF Littlejohn
23. The Cabinet Office’s tender for the contract to review Kids Company required the 
successful bidder to provide the Government with assurances about the effectiveness 
of Kids Company’s governance. PKF Littlejohn now says that the original scope was 
narrowed, in agreement with Cabinet Office, to establishing whether the policies 
and procedures in place were appropriate. PKF Littlejohn asserts that Ministers 
took assurances from the report that were outside the scope of the review. The 
Cabinet Office should have identified that the PKF Littlejohn remit had altered and 
communicated this message clearly to future users of the report. This would have 
minimised the weight Ministers placed upon the very limited assurances the report 
offered. (Paragraph 89)
24. However, it is not acceptable that a report commissioned to provide a professional 
assessment of a charity’s governance and controls looked only at systems and 
processes; as Mr Duke acknowledged, good controls can be overridden. PKF 
Littlejohn’s review did not assess the organisation’s sustainability in financial and 
reputational terms and proved to be of little value in assessing the effectiveness of 
the organisation’s governance. Without reviewing, for example, decision-making, 
attitudes and habits of behaviour, risk-management and strategic objectives in 
the organisation, a contractor could not assess the effectiveness of the charity’s 
governance and controls and deliver upon the tender’s requirements. (Paragraph 90)
PricewaterhouseCoopers
25. PwC’s preliminary report was of little value to Kids Company, the Charity 
Commission or the Cabinet Office. Although investigation into one allegation 
had been completed, the remaining reports were subject to such heavy caveats 
in consequence of the very short timeframe that no conclusions could be drawn. 
Nevertheless, the report was cited by supporters of Kids Company as proof 
there was no substance to the allegations. Kids Company’s rush to complete the 
investigation resulted in a report that offered no real assurances for the considerable 
costs incurred. (Paragraph 97)
26. All three professional firms identified matters of concern relating to Kids Company, 
yet not one of them reported the scale of risk carried by the charity to the Trustees, 
the Cabinet Office or Charity Commission. This is a salutary warning about the use 
of professional advisers. They are no substitute for the exercise of judgement. They 
tend to limit the scope of the terms of their investigation in order to limit their own 
exposure to risk. In this case, they were able to avoid making any examination of the 
wider issues that threatened the charity’s existence. In the partial assurances they 
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offered, the resulting reports may actually have obscured more than they revealed 
to those who read them. (Paragraph 98)
Monitoring of Kids Company’s finances
27. It is remarkable that so few people thought it appropriate to complain to the 
Charity Commission about Kids Company, despite donors and others expressing 
concerns as far back as 2002, and open adverse comment about Kids Company in 
the media. This reflects the Charity Commission’s failure to make people aware of 
this possibility. Complaints would have prompted investigation and could have led 
to improvements in the charity’s governance and operations. (Paragraph 105)
28. In the months leading up to Kids Company’s collapse, the Charity Commission 
worked closely with the charity after receiving complaints from a donor and former 
employees, but substantive discussions about its precarious financial situation only 
occurred after the charity’s finances reached crisis point. Earlier intervention from 
the Charity Commission to advise changes to the operating model might have 
helped to safeguard the charity, although this has not historically been the role of 
the Charity Commission. The Charity Commission must make its own judgement 
about a charity, rather than simply relying on government engagement with an 
organisation as evidence of a charity’s good governance or effectiveness. (Paragraph 
106)
29. We welcome the provisions in the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) 
Bill to give the Charity Commission new powers to disqualify a person 
from being a charity Trustee if: at least one of six conditions applies to the 
individual; if an individual is unfit to be a Trustee; and if making the order is 
desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence 
in charities (either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of 
charity specified or described in the order). Amongst the six conditions that 
may, in conjunction with the tests mentioned above, disqualify a person from 
being a Trustee is if a the person was a Trustee, charity Trustee, officer, agent or 
employee of a charity at a time when there was misconduct or mismanagement 
in the administration of the charity, and was: responsible for the misconduct or 
mismanagement; knew of the misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take 
any reasonable step to oppose it; or the person’s conduct contributed to or facilitated 
the misconduct or mismanagement. The Charity Commission’s new powers may be 
applicable to the case of Kids Company. (Paragraph 107)
30. There are both legal parameters and resourcing issues that currently limit what the 
Charity Commission can do to improve the effectiveness of a charity’s governance. It 
is the role of Trustees, not the regulator, to ensure that a charity is well run. However, 
if the Charity Commission is to maintain public faith in charities and deliver on its 
statutory duty to prevent, detect and tackle mismanagement in charities, it must 
have the resources and powers to advise and investigate charities at an earlier stage 
and to support charities through restructures and downsizing. (Paragraph 108)
31. While it is not possible for the Charity Commission to interrogate deeply the 60,000 
accounts it reportedly receives each year, high risk charities – for example those 
with a large number of employees or a vulnerable client base – must be under the 
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greatest scrutiny. We await with interest the outcome of the Charity Commission’s 
technology transformation plan, which should enable the Commission to identify 
and scrutinise high-risk charities. (Paragraph 109)
32. Trustees must have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that a charity has a responsible 
approach to reserves but the Charity Commission must do more to help to make 
Trustees aware of their responsibilities in this area. We look forward to the Charity 
Commission’s reviewed guidance on charity reserves, and expect it will impress upon 
Trustees of large or complex charities their increased responsibilities in this area. 
(Paragraph 110)
33. The Charity Commission should revise its guidance to auditors, to ensure that 
expectations about auditors’ reporting duties under Section 156 of the Charities Act 
2011 are appropriately conveyed. Such guidance must be clearer on the circumstances 
in which auditors should pass on concerns about an unsustainable operating model, 
including an inappropriate reserves policy. (Paragraph 111)
34. The Charity Commission should consider how it can better impress upon Trustees the 
need to ensure that the Board includes those with appropriate experience of the areas 
relevant to the charity’s activities. Some Trustees must have this relevant experience, 
so that they can evaluate the quality of the charity’s activities, and a range of skills 
must be reflected on the Board. All Trustees must have a responsible attitude towards 
governance. (Paragraph 112)
Donor complaint
35. The conflicting accounts offered by Kids Company and the Charity Commission 
about whether guidance was given about returning a large donation, and the 
propriety of Kids Company’s behaviour in this case is cause for concern. The 
Charity Commission’s resources and existing statutory framework prevent it 
from intervening in donor issues that do not involve illegality – but the Charity 
Commission has not presented any evidence which conveys the disapproval that 
they have voiced subsequently. We are pleased that the Charity Commission will be 
reviewing their guidance about managing relationships with donors. This guidance 
must better communicate the duties of charities towards their donors. (Paragraph 
117)
36. In all communications with charities regarding individual donor complaints, the 
Charity Commission must communicate any advice to a charity in writing, even if 
there has been no illegal activity on the part of a charity. (Paragraph 118)
The role of the Charity Commission
37. It is a matter of some concern that a number of witnesses who had grave concerns 
about the charity did not alert the Charity Commission. As Mr Brooks’s and Ms 
Berelowitz’s comments indicate, the Charity Commission projects too limited a 
public profile to provide much reassurance about charities and their regulation, 
and to attract complaints. If individuals are to understand the role of the Charity 
Commission, then the Charity Commission needs to be seen to be actively holding 
charities to account. (Paragraph 120)
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38. The Charity Commission must do more to make the public aware that they can 
and should take their concerns about a charity to the Charity Commission. The 
Commission should investigate adverse media reports about a charity and encourage 
journalists to make formal complaints to the Charity Commission, rather than relying 
upon the Charity Commission to chance upon their reports. Its guidance should 
also urge Trustees to make donors, employees and beneficiaries aware that they 
should complain to the Charity Commission if they have serious concerns about the 
governance of a charity. (Paragraph 121)
39. The Treasury and Cabinet Office must address the future funding of the Charity 
Commission so that it can carry out its functions in the way that Government, 
charities and the public expects. (Paragraph 122)
40. In order to underline the constitutional status of the Commission’s Board, the 
Commission should restore the proper title of its Board members, so they are known 
as the Charity Commissioners. This would both restore their unique status, and 
underline that the Chair and his fellow commissioners are jointly and severally liable 
for the conduct of the Charity Commission in England and Wales, just as a Chair and 
other Trustees should understand how they are responsible for a charity they govern. 
(Paragraph 123)
Relationship with No. 10
41. The privileged access to Ministers, numerous ‘special grants’ and exemption from 
usual reporting processes appear to have distorted the expectations of the charity’s 
leadership and undermined the warnings issued by Government that funding might 
not continue. In allowing an unconventional relationship and funding process to 
develop, successive governments left themselves vulnerable to misunderstandings – 
wilful or otherwise – on the part of the charity, about the level of support that Kids 
Company could expect to receive from Government in the future. (Paragraph 136)
42. Ms Batmanghelidjh and Kids Company appeared to captivate some of the most senior 
political figures in the land, by the force of the Chief Executive’s personality as much 
as by the spin and profile she generated for the charity. As a consequence, objective 
judgements about Kids Company were set aside. The Government’s relationship 
with Kids Company was forged outside the usual decision-making processes of 
Whitehall departments and there is little doubt that the high profile support of 
successive Prime Ministers for Kids Company had an impact upon decision-making 
across Whitehall. This included the authorisation of multiple grants outside of the 
normal competitive process. We also question whether it was wise to move youth 
funding from the Department for Education into the Cabinet Office. Had that not 
occurred, it is possible that less money would have gone to Kids Company and more 
to other, perhaps better run, youth charities. Other charities have said that they are 
angry and cynical about how one or two charities gain unfair advantage, and that 
the approach of successive Governments towards Kids Company has damaged their 
confidence in Government. (Paragraph 137)
43. It is also a matter of considerable concern that the knowledge of the high-level 
political patronage enjoyed by Kids Company may have deterred other individuals 
from coming forward with concerns about the charity. (Paragraph 138)
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44. We concur with the Public Accounts Committee’s recommendation that, at the very 
least, if the Government decides to use special powers to grant funding, it should 
provide a transparent case for its decision and report regularly on the use of these 
powers. Ministers and Government departments must deploy proven methods of 
assessment and co-ordinate these effectively, and exercise objective judgement when 
deciding whether to grant taxpayers’ money to charities. (Paragraph 139)
45. When allocating funding to charities, Ministers should not risk creating the perception 
that they are overriding official advice on the basis of personal prejudice or political 
considerations. In circumstances where they disagree with official advice regarding 
the release of grants to a particular charity, Ministers, including Prime Ministers, 
should consider whether such disagreement arises from a conflict of interest. If a 
conflict could be judged to exist, the Minister or Ministers must recuse themselves 
from decision-making, including from any influence over any other Ministers making 
those decisions. Ministers should not allow charity representatives to exploit their 
access to Government in a way that may be unethical. There must be no suggestion 
that individual Ministers have funds under their personal control or are exercising 
personal patronage. (Paragraph 140)
46. It should be for the relevant departments to control grants to charities, not the Cabinet 
Office or another department that does not have direct policy responsibility for the 
sector in question. As the Cabinet Office is the department most closely under the 
Prime Minister’s control, the existing structure leaves the Prime Minister exposed to 
the kind of pressures which Kids Company thought it could exert. (Paragraph 141)
47. Government should re-evaluate the standard process by which grant decisions 
benefiting charities can be made following input from a number of different 
departments. This review should consider the creation of an account manager to 
oversee all funding decisions for each charity. This would enable greater continuity 
and accountability than seen in the case of Kids Company, which was passed between 
several departments throughout its existence. (Paragraph 142)
48. The Government should consider whether sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure 
that the Libor Fund is administered in line with these principles of objectivity and 
transparency. (Paragraph 143)
Government monitoring
49. It is astounding that it was only in 2015, by which point Kids Company had received 
over £35 million from central Government, that the Government acknowledged the 
need for a robust examination of the charity’s activities and outcomes. Given that 
doubts were reportedly raised about Kids Company in the DfE, we also question the 
quality of co-ordination between Government departments, following the transfer 
of youth policy. (Paragraph 149)
50. Evidence that former employees have submitted to this inquiry has highlighted the 
charity’s dependency on selective case studies to evidence its impact. While case-
studies may have a role to play in illustrating a charity’s work, wider evidence of 
impact is required. This is particularly true for charities in receipt of large amounts 
of Government money. We struggle to see on what basis successive Governments and 
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other grant-giving bodies, and indeed the charity’s Trustees, satisfied themselves of 
the appropriateness of support given to clients, and the value of the charity’s high 
resource model. (Paragraph 150)
51. It is unacceptable that successive Ministers appear to have released funds on the basis 
of little more than their relationship with a charismatic leader, small-scale studies 
and anecdotes, and no more than two visits made by Mr Letwin more than 10 years 
previously. Releasing Kids Company from the usual competitive grant processes 
to which other charities are subject, despite a lack of evidence about the efficacy 
of its model or any evaluation of outcomes, has been proved to be an unjustifiable 
way to conduct Government business and to handle public money. This approach 
is condemned by the fact of Kids Company’s failure and is therefore unjustifiable in 
the future. (Paragraph 151)
52. Government doubted that the information that Kids Company was circulating 
regarding its client number was true, but did nothing to correct the record. Instead, 
it continued to grant funding despite that knowledge. (Paragraph 152)
53. We agree with the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC’s) recommendation that the 
Government should undertake a fundamental review of how it makes direct and 
non-competitive grants to the voluntary sector. In addition to the areas the PAC 
recommends for consideration, we see the creation of a measurement framework for 
the social sector as essential to this. The use of standardised measurement tools will 
enable more accurate assessments of the value of activity, and enable meaningful 
comparisons to take place during grant bidding and monitoring. Identifying a charity’s 
outcomes, rather than simply its outputs, and benchmarking these in relation to other 
organisations in the sector should be a core part of any funding decision. (Paragraph 
153)
54. We also agree with the recommendations made by the PAC that the Government 
should improve the way it monitors and evaluates the performance of grant-funded 
organisations. (Paragraph 154)
55. If the Government is funding an organisation that provides services such as therapy 
or education, it must satisfy itself that these services are being delivered by people who 
are sufficiently qualified to be doing so. For example, a number of local authorities, 
amongst them Southwark Council, no longer commission Alternative Provision 
Education from providers that are not registered with Ofsted. Central Government 
should similarly consider making external inspection from the relevant regulatory 
body (e.g. CQC or Ofsted) a condition of commissioning, so that it can be sure of the 
quality of services being delivered. (Paragraph 155)
56. The Government should insist that charities to which it provides grants provide legally 
defensible contingency plans. This would help to mitigate the risks of a charity with 
vulnerable beneficiaries folding unexpectedly. (Paragraph 156)
Government’s use of professional services
57. Information about the charity was reported in a piecemeal fashion across various 
reviews that actually offered little or no assurance about the effectiveness of Kids 
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Company’s governance. They were read selectively to gain confirmation of a pre-
existing and positive picture of the charity. Government must learn lessons about its 
use of such reviews, and co-ordinate its activities. (Paragraph 158)
58. The scope of the PFK Littlejohn review became limited to the point where the final 
report to the Cabinet Office provided none of the information needed to assess the 
governance of the charity. It is of particular concern that, when making funding 
decisions, a Minister took assurances from the report that the report did not offer. 
(Paragraph 160)
59. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, examine the process by which it 
commissions reviews to ensure that it receives the information it requires. It is essential 
to ensure that the commissioning process does not allow drift from the original scope. 
Consideration should be given to requiring successful contractors to outline explicitly 
what level of assurance on specific issues the Government will be able to take from 
their final report. (Paragraph 161)
60. The Government was right to attempt to assess the governance of a charity before 
awarding funds. However, rather than commissioning a review of a charity’s policies 
and processes from one of the usual outside firms, the Government should develop 
its own Civil Service capability in order to exercise its own judgement about whether 
a charity’s governance, quality of decision-making, objective setting and culture are 
effective, and if its internal controls are sufficient. There should be particular caution 
towards Boards in which Trustees have held their position for more than two terms, 
and towards Boards where no individuals have experience in the charity’s particular 
area of delivery. (Paragraph 162)
61. This inquiry should provide a reminder to all whose use charity accounts that a clear 
audit report gives no indication that the charity is well-managed or any assurance 
that charitable funds are being used wisely and in accordance with the stated 
purposes of the charity. Charity Trustees also have an obligation to be accountable 
to their donors. (Paragraph 164)
62. The Government must not rely upon audited accounts being signed off as a going 
concern as any assurance that a charity is financially well-managed or well-governed. 
At the very least, Government must request sight of a charity’s management letters, 
and should seek direct assurance from the charity’s auditors. (Paragraph 165)
63. When commissioning external audits or reviews, Government should give priority to 
contractors with specific experience of the relevant field (e.g. of children’s services) so 
that meaningful benchmarking can take place. (Paragraph 166)
64. We are concerned that the Cabinet Office was prepared to hand over money, on 
a Minister’s say so against official advice, to an organisation in which serious 
allegations had not been fully investigated. We are not convinced by Mr Letwin’s 
assertion that the planned changes to the charity’s leadership rendered the allegations 
under investigation irrelevant. It was an error for the Government to release a second 
“final” grant to a charity with a history of financial mismanagement, and in which 
the new Trustees and, as yet unidentified, permanent CEO had not yet proved their 
competence or commitment to making serious changes to the organisation’s ethos 
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and practices. We recommend that in future no department should hand over money 
to an organisation in which serious allegations have not been fully investigated. 
(Paragraph 169)
April 2015 grant
65. The Cabinet Office Ministers’ faith in Kids Company’s commitment to move to a 
sustainable operating model was misplaced. This was demonstrated by the charity 
returning to request additional funding six weeks later. The decision to pay the full 
amount of the April grant in one lump sum, rather than waiting for fulfilment of 
any of the grant conditions, was not conducive to accountability. The April grant 
was one more example of the Government providing emergency funding to enable 
the charity to manage its cash flow, outside of any competitive or evidence-driven 
process. It failed to deliver any of the desired outcomes. (Paragraph 173)
Ministerial Direction 2015
66. In neither his letter of direction nor his oral evidence has Mr Letwin provided 
convincing justification for his and Mr Hancock’s decision to ignore the 
comprehensive advice of senior officials, whose concerns Mr Letwin acknowledged 
as accurate and valid. This grant should not have been authorised contrary to advice. 
(Paragraph 179)
67. We do not share Mr Letwin’s confidence that the restructuring of Kids Company 
“might well have turned out, in practice, to have been an abundant success” were 
it not for the allegations of sexual abuse that emerged later. As the new Finance 
Director had only been in place for a matter of weeks and the new Chief Executive 
had not been appointed, there was insufficient evidence that the new leadership could 
transform the organisation’s business model and activities. Our understanding of 
Ms Batmanghelidjh’s dominant role in dictating the charity’s direction, despite not 
holding a Trustee position, and her historic refusal to shrink the organisation make 
us doubtful about whether the new role of ‘President’ would significantly curtail the 
influence by which she had hitherto controlled the organisation. Equally, the fact that 
the Chair of Trustees, who had condoned the excessive spending and unsustainable 
model over a period of 12 years, was to remain on the Board of Trustees for the 
foreseeable future makes us question the impact that the changes to the charity’s 
leadership would actually have had. (Paragraph 183)
68. The Government Ministers’ willingness to pay £3 million to the charity before 
receiving the matched funding from philanthropists was unwise and represents a 
failure in the responsibility Ministers should take for handling taxpayers’ money. 
Had the Cabinet Office insisted that the money from philanthropists was received 
before Government made payment, or insisted that both sources of funding were 
held in an escrow, this would have considerably increased the likelihood of public 
money being returned. As it was, £1 million had already been spent by the charity, 
and it is still unknown whether the remaining £2 million of public money can be 
reclaimed. (Paragraph 184)
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Annex A
Kids Company’s Board of Trustees
Although PACAC took oral evidence only from Mr Yentob, the Chair of Kids Company’s 
Board of Trustees, all trustees are jointly responsible for the charity they govern. As outlined 
in the Charity Commission’s guidance to trustees, “A chair can only make decisions in 
accordance with any provision in the governing document or delegated authority agreed 
by the trustees, and should notify the other trustees of any decisions made”. 264
At the time of Kids Company’s collapse in August 2015, the trustee board comprised:
• Chair - Alan Yentob, Creative Director BBC
• Deputy Chair - Richard Handover, previously Chairman and CEO of WH Smith
• Francesca Robinson, Executive Chairman of PSD Group, responsible for strategy and 
leadership. (Annual turnover £30m and 400 staff.) She led a successful management 
buyout in 2010
• Jane Tyler, senior lawyer and partner in Macfarlane’s law firm
• Erica Bolton, founding partner/Director, Bolton & Quinn, international PR 
consultancy 
• Andrew Webster, formally Vice President with responsibility for human resources at 
Astrazeneca
• Sunetra Atkinson, philanthropist. Spent several days a month working pro bono for 
Kids Company, organising and funding the warehouse that stored and distributed 
donated goods for the Poverty Busting Programme
264 The Essential Trustee: What you need to know, what you need to do 
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Annex B
Funding provided by central Government throughout successive 
governments
Source: National Audit Office
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Formal Minutes
Thursday 21 January 2016
Members present:











Draft Report (The collapse of Kids Company: lessons for charity trustees, professional firms, 
the Charity Commission, and Whitehall), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 184 read and agreed to.
Summary and Annexes agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Tuesday 26 January at 10.30am
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry page of 
the Committee’s website.
Thursday 15 October 2015 Question number
Camila Batmanghelidjh, founder and former Chief Executive, Kids 
Company, and Alan Yentob, former Chairman of Trustees, Kids Company Q1–244
Tuesday 17 November 2015
Will Richardson, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Q245–306
Alastair Duke, Partner, PKF Littlejohn, Q307–402
Nick Brooks, Partner, Kingston Smith Q403–520
Sue Berelowitz, Former Deputy Children’s Commissioner Q521–548
Thursday 19 November 2015
Tim Loughton MP, former Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Children and Families, Department for Education Q549–628
Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Q629–797
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Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry page of the 
Committee’s website. 
KCI numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 A 1 (KCI0007)
2 A 1 (KCI0008)
3 A 2 (KCI0013)
4 A 3 (KCI0014)
5 A 4 (KCI0015)
6 A 5 (KCI0016)
7 A 6 (KCI0017)
8 A 7 (KCI0018)
9 A 8 (KCI0019)
10 A 9 (KCI0020)
11 A 10 (KCI0021)
12 A 11 (KCI0025)
13 A 12 (KCI0026)
14 A 13 (KCI0027)
15 A 14 (KCI0028)
16 A 15 (KCI0036)
17 A 16 (KCI0042)
18 A 17 (KCI0043)
19 Alan Yentob (KCI0049)
20 Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations (KCI0001)
21 Cabinet Office (KCI0003)
22 Cabinet Office (KCI0004)
23 Camila Batmanghelidjh (KCI0048)
24 Camila Batmanghelidjh and Alan Yentob (KCI0047)
25 Charity Commission (KCI0038)
26 Danny Parr (KCI0029)
27 David Quirke-Thornton (KCI0044)
28 David van Eegan (KCI0034)
29 Dee Cracknell (KCI0030)
30 Esther Pickup Keller (KCI0045)
31 Genevieve Maitland (KCI0031)
32 Harriet Sergeant (KCI0009)
33 Jennifer Watts (KCI0041)
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34 Joan Woolard (KCI0033)
35 Johanna Morrell (KCI0032)
36 Kingston Smith (KCI0039)
37 Kingston Smith LLP (KCI0024)
38 Laurence Guinness (KCI0006)
39 Mr Alan Yentob (KCI0002)
40 Mr Alan Yentob (KCI0005)
41 Ofsted (KCI0037)
42 PKF Littlejohn (KCI0023)
43 Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (KCI0046)
44 Sally Easton (KCI0011)
45 Sue Berelowitz (KCI0035)
46 Susie Cunningham (KCI0022)
47 Tim Loughton MP (KCI0040)
48 Zievrina Wilson (KCI0012)
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